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We live in the information age (Fuchs, 2007). New technological, scientific
and societal developments have reconstructed main pillars of modern society
like business and government (Gleick, 2011; Lyon, 2013). The production,
provision and access to information has become a key economic activity that
drives a substantial part of wealth creation (Floridi, 2010). Governments
make use of mandatory information provision policies and increasingly uti-
lize information interventions to reach a diverse set of policy goals, ranging
from environmental protection to unemployment reduction (Bar-Gill et al.,
2019; Ben-Shahar and Schneider, 2011; Sunstein, 2016). Furthermore, the rise
of social media and the internet has made it clear that the use and abuse of
information can shape outcomes of elections and referendums, incite vio-
lence and even lead to large geopolitical crises (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017;
Brooking and Singer, 2016; Lazer et al., 2018).
People play several important roles with regards to information. They are, at
the same time, recipients as well as providers of information (Floridi, 2010,
2014). In their role as recipients, people acquire information for various
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purposes, for example to help them make decisions or update their beliefs
(Stigler, 1961). As information providers, people must decide which and how
much of their information to provide to others, shaping their decisions and
beliefs. To which information people have access can profoundly influence
all sorts of important outcomes for them (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009). It can
affect their professional lives, for example by contributing to their choice
of profession (Coffman et al., 2017), their health, for example by inform-
ing people about calorie counts of food (Elbel et al., 2009) or their financial
well-being, for example by promoting retirement saving (Fernandes et al.,
2014). This illustrates that the impact that the informational environment
that surrounds people and to which they contribute is immense (Webster,
2014). Especially with the rise of government-mandated information pro-
vision, people increasingly play a third role as regulators of informational
environments. They have to decide whether they support or oppose policies
that provide information, for example on retirement plans, energy use or
product safety (Reisch and Sunstein, 2016) or how social media platforms,
an increasingly important source of information, should be governed (Kruse
et al., 2018).
This thesis contributes to our understanding of the three roles that peo-
ple play in the information society. Traditionally, economists have viewed
information as an instrumental means to reach better decisions and noth-
ing else (Golman et al., 2017; Stigler, 1961). Information acquisition was
described as a process in which people rationally updated their beliefs based
on Bayes’ rule if they received relevant information while irrelevant infor-
mation was discarded (Benjamin, 2019). Therefore, receiving additional
information was always either positive or neutral for the recipient as it either
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improved their decisions or did not affect them. Information provision was
seen as a way to achieve self-interested goals and maximize utility of the
provider without regards to the recipient (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Jin
et al., 2015; Oehler and Wendt, 2017). These views are increasingly chal-
lenged by a large and growing literature in behavioral and experimental
economics (DellaVigna, 2009; Loewenstein et al., 2014). Through the use of
data that is collected in laboratory, field and online experiments, economists
have vastly extended the understanding of how people act in their roles of
recipients, providers and regulators of information. Behavioral economics
has contributed in two main ways to the understanding of people in their
different roles. The first strand of literature has documented that people are
not perfectly rational when updating their beliefs based on new information
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1983). Rather, they make systematic errors in that
process, undervaluing older signals (Benjamin, 2019), ignoring the absence
of information (Enke, 2020) or focusing too strongly on information that con-
firms pre-existing beliefs (Bénabou and Tirole, 2016). Due to these mistakes,
information provision can negatively impact recipients, leading to worse
decisions or biased beliefs. The second main contribution of behavioral eco-
nomics is the study of people’s social preferences. This literature has shown
that people’s actions deviate from pure self-interest. Rather, they take the
outcomes of others into account when they make decisions (Charness and
Rabin, 2002). Given that information provision strongly impacts recipients’
outcomes, people might take these consequences into account when deciding
which and how much information to provide. A large body of literature has
empirically documented that actions are often motivated by factors beyond
narrow self-interest and that people consider the outcomes of others when
making important choices (Almås et al., 2010; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Fehr
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and Schmidt, 1999; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). Other moral considerations
also influence their decisions on which and how much information to pro-
vide. Previous research has documented that people are reluctant to lie and
provide false information even when that would be in their own financial
interest (Abeler et al., 2019; Gneezy, 2005; Gneezy et al., 2018). These findings
illustrate the need to account for the absence of perfectly rational updating
and social preferences when studying people’s behavior in their role as recip-
ients, providers and regulator of information. This thesis combines insights
from both strands of the behavioral economics literature. It explores human
behavior that is motivated by social preferences or biased beliefs. Thereby,
this dissertation provides new insight into how people decide which policies
to support, how they make decisions that influence outcomes for themselves
and others and what they consider fair or unfair. More precisely, the thesis
consists of three chapters that describe and understand behavior in settings
in which people make information-related choices. It shows how people’s
actions as recipients, providers and regulators of information are profoundly
shaped by their concern for others, their biases in dealing with information
and the need and desire for transparent and truthful information.
To investigate how people act as recipients, providers and regulators of
information, the present thesis uses experimental methods. The use of these
methods was essentially nonexistent in economics for a long time. In the
1985 version of their popular undergraduate textbook, Samuelson and Nord-
haus wrote that "[Economists] cannot perform the controlled experiments of
chemists or biologists because they cannot easily control other important fac-
tors" (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1985). The paradigm that economics cannot
rely on data that is collected in experimental settings shifted in the 1970s and
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1980s due to economists’ increasing attention to systematic deviations from
standard economic theory in people’s behavior (Barberis, 2018). In a vast
array of fields, economists documented that people are motivated by factors
that lie outside the standard assumptions of rational models. Researchers
increasingly made use of laboratory, online and field experiments to test the-
ories and gain novel insight into the ways people form attitudes and beliefs,
make decisions and to test the influence of certain factors in complex settings
(List, 2011). In particular, the opportunity to tightly control the situation in
which decisions are made has empowered economists to develop new mod-
els that better reflect human behavior, to understand market interactions and
to develop new, efficient policy measures to achieve important societal goals
(List, 2008). Furthermore, due to random assignment of participants, experi-
ments allow researchers to draw causal conclusions from their results (Thaler,
2015). This makes it possible to directly infer the impact of different factors
and conditions on people’s behavior, something that is often very difficult or
even impossible to do outside the realm of experimental settings. To ensure
robustness of results and engagement of participants, economists often use
incentives, for example financial compensation or the promise of real-world
impact, when they run experiments (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999). These
incentives can take different forms. Participants’ decisions can either directly
impact outcomes for themselves (stakeholders) or they can act as impartial
third-parties whose actions influence other people’s outcomes (spectators)
(Cappelen et al., 2007; Konow, 2009). Both methods allow economists to
answer important questions about human behavior. Stakeholder designs
enable the study of people’s actions in situations in which their outcomes are
directly affected, for example in their roles as market participants (Bartling
et al., 2015; Falk and Szech, 2013; Thaler, 1980) or voters (Bond et al., 2012;
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DellaVigna et al., 2016). Spectator designs however allow economists to
measure people’s attitudes, for example towards fairness, because their ac-
tions are unaffected by considerations of self-interest (Almås et al., 2020).
The three recent Nobel Prizes to Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith (2002),
Richard Thaler (2015) and Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo and Michael Kremer
(2019) reflect that the use of experiments has become one key method in the
toolkit of economics and has already provided new and crucial findings. The
present thesis follows the experimental tradition. The three chapters of this
thesis report results from four tightly-controlled, incentivized experiments.
Both methods, spectator and stakeholder designs were used to shed light
on people’s behavior in their roles as recipients, providers, and regulators
of information and to causally investigate how this behavior is affected by
social preferences and biased beliefs.
Economists’ increasing focus on factors beyond self-interest and the growing
use of experimental methods has broadened the topics that economists study
(Angrist and Pischke, 2010; Angrist et al., 2017). While in the past, economics
was largely insulated from other social and behavioral sciences (Fourcade
et al., 2015; Pieters and Baumgartner, 2002), resulting in important gaps in
economists’ understanding of key social phenomena (Akerlof, 2020), it has
become increasingly common for economists to rely on work done in other
fields, especially psychology and political science (Angrist et al., 2020). The
more comprehensive scope of economic research and the inclusion of non-
economic work enables economists to contribute to the solution of pressing
societal issues, including income and wealth inequality (Alesina et al., 2018),
discrimination (Acquisti and Fong, 2020), and the new challenges that social
media poses to well-being (Allcott et al., 2020) and democracy (Enikolopov et
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al., 2020). The three chapters in this dissertation are motivated and informed
by research that is conducted in fields beyond economics. They build on
work that has been done by economists, political scientists, psychologists
and other scientists alike. All chapters benefited from helpful comments
from researchers from a variety of fields. This wide range of insights makes
it possible to present findings that directly contribute to important current
political debates.
The following questions are addressed in the three chapters below:
Chapter 1: Do people perceive information provision as a moral obligation?
Chapter 2: Are voluntary transactions in which one side misunderstands informa-
tion and is taken advantage of by the other perceived as acceptable?
Chapter 3: What drives people’s opposition to political microtargeting, a way
to address audiences in a highly granular way with tailor-made information and
messages?
Although all chapters address very different research questions, they are con-
nected by important commonalities. The most striking of course is the focus
on information. However, the common threads run deeper than that. All
the chapters present results from large incentivized online experiments with
general population samples of the United States. The use of experimental
methodology offers the opportunity to investigate the influence of attitudes
and beliefs on people’s behavior. Due to random assignment of participants
to treatment conditions and a high level of control over the situation in which
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decisions are made, it is possible to draw causal conclusions about the im-
pact that certain factors have on people’s behavior with regards to their roles
as recipients, providers and regulators of information. While the first two
chapters rely on spectator designs as they study people’s attitudes towards
fairness, the third chapter focuses more directly on people’s support for rules
that could impact their own lives. The use of general population samples
allows for gaining a broader understanding of public attitudes that go be-
yond the relatively narrow confines of student populations. Participants
in all of the studies make decisions that will have a real-world impact. To
contribute to transparency in empirical research, experimental designs and
main hypotheses of all studies were pre-registered at the AEA RCT Registry
(Chapters 1 and 3) or the Open Science Foundation (Chapter 2) before data
analysis (Munafò et al., 2017; Nosek et al., 2015).
The first chapter of the dissertation is titled "There is something you should
know - the moral obligation to provide information". This chapter studies whether
people are willing to provide information even when that leads to outcomes
that they dislike. It is motivated by the mounting evidence that information
provision can have negative consequences for some recipients while helping
others (Persson, 2018; Roberts, 2017). Therefore, information provision can
contribute to or create inequality between recipients. A large body of litera-
ture has shown that people in general are averse to inequality (Cappelen et
al., 2007, 2013b; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999). As a consequence, they could be willing to withhold part
of their information to avoid undesirable distributive outcomes. However,
a vast literature in philosophy and medical ethics posits that people could
feel morally obliged to provide information for reasons that are unrelated
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to the material outcomes information provision produces, for example, as a
means to provide other people with autonomy (Cox and Fritz, 2016; Kym-
licka, 2002).
The chapter reports the results of two large incentivized experiments that in-
vestigate whether people are willing to provide information that has distribu-
tive consequences to which they are averse. Participants in the experiment
make decisions that have a real impact on the outcomes of two other people.
The results of both studies strongly support the hypothesis that people have
the attitude that there is a moral obligation to provide information. As a
consequence of this perception, a significant share of people are willing to
accept outcomes they dislike when they are the consequence of information
provision. This finding is robust across settings and demographic and politi-
cal groups. Further exploratory data analysis reveals a close link between
people’s attitudes towards autonomy and the belief that there is a moral
obligation to provide information. In line with the discussion in philosophy,
participants that prefer autonomy over outcomes also seem more likely to
accept outcomes that they dislike if they are the consequence of information
provision (Fallis, 2018; Harris and Keywood, 2001). This suggests that peo-
ple see the provision of information as a way to provide other people with
autonomy and that the respect for autonomy is an important source of the
perception that there is a moral obligation to provide information.
The second chapter of this thesis has the name "Cancel the deal? An ex-
perimental study on the exploitation of irrational consumers" and is co-authored
with Alexander W. Cappelen and Bertil Tungodden. Economists pay increas-
ing attention to situations in which companies take advantage of consumers
who misunderstand information about products or mispredicting their own
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future behavior, thereby increasing profits (Akerlof and Shiller, 2015; Heid-
hues and Kőszegi, 2018). In these settings, companies and consumers agree
to one-sided transactions which only benefit the sophisticated seller while
harming the naive buyers (Korobkin, 2003). Yet, often these transactions are
uncoerced and voluntary, without either side lying to the other. Therefore,
different conceptions of fairness could drive people’s attitudes towards these
transactions. This study focuses on the question on whether people perceive
these voluntary but exploitative transactions as acceptable or not.
The study introduces an experimental framework that allows to measure
people’s acceptance of transactions in which a seller exploits the naivety of
a buyer and to disentangle their reasoning for that judgment. Participants
can decide whether they want to cancel a transaction between a pair of
other people, a buyer and a seller. In the experimental setting, the seller
takes advantage of the buyer who misunderstood information about the
value of the product. The findings reveal that a large majority of Americans
perceives such transactions as unacceptable and are willing to cancel them.
This attitude seems to be driven by aversion to the one-sided outcomes of
such transactions. However, about a third of Americans considers these
transactions as fair, even when the seller behaved unethically towards the
buyer by obfuscating important information about the value of the product
and proposing a one-sided deal. This shows that for a substantial share of
the population, fairness concerns are closely connected with considerations
of autonomy.
In summary, the paper shows that a large share of participants perceives it as
unfair if people who do not properly understand information are exploited
by others. This strongly suggests that full, transparent information provision
is seen as an important foundation for a fair transaction.
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The third chapter of this dissertation is co-authored with Hanna Krasnova
and Katharina Baum and is called "Partisan self-interest is an important driver
for people’s support for the regulation of targeted political advertising". This chap-
ter examines the role of partisan self-interest, the drive to benefit one’s own
political party, in people’s attitude towards microtargeted political advertis-
ing online. Microtargeted political advertising has become an increasingly
important way for politicians to reach out to potential and likely voters
(Aral and Eckles, 2019). It requires the collection and use of vast amount of
personal information about voters, raising concerns about personal privacy
(Acquisti et al., 2016; Boerman et al., 2017). Furthermore, because messages
and information are designed for potentially small groups of voters and
are inaccessible for others, this creates an intransparent public discourse
(Sunstein, 2018). As a consequence of this lack of transparency, people have
to form beliefs about how others are influenced by political advertising and
how that will affect political outcomes.
Participants in the study are asked if they support stricter government control
of microtargeted political advertisement. To incentivize truthful responses,
their answers are aggregated and presented to members of the United States
Senate and House of Representatives. The study reveals that a significant
share of the public opposition to targeted political advertising is motivated
by potentially biased beliefs about their impact on electoral outcomes. Par-
tisans, who are informed that their preferred party has benefited from the
use of targeted political advertising in the past become less supportive of
stricter government regulation. This suggests that they are willing to accept
violations of personal privacy as long as this this will help their party win.
This outcome reveals the necessity of an informed and transparent public
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debate about the impact of technological innovation on electoral processes.
In this setting, information changed people’s attitudes towards targeted
political advertising, suggesting that current opinions on their stronger reg-
ulation might be biased due to the scarcity of insight about the effects of
microtargeting and its intransparent nature.
Taken together, the results presented in the three chapters show how people
act in the roles as recipients, providers, and regulators of information. The
studies add to the growing behavioral and experimental literature that inves-
tigates how people’s actions in these roles deviate from classical assumptions.
By combining insight from the literature on social preferences and systematic
biases, the findings show that people highly value information provision and
transparency and that they strongly consider the outcomes of others that are
the consequence of their actions. The three chapters emphasize the impor-
tance of information on economic and public life and open up new avenues
for future research. The experimental paradigms that are presented in the
three chapters enable future studies to further disentangle the motivations of
people in their roles as recipients, providers, and regulators of information
in an incentive-compatible, tightly-controlled manner. They make it possible
to further build on the results that were presented here and to deepen our
understanding of the role of information in people’s lives.
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Chapter 1
There is something you should




Information provision can lead to gains for some but losses for other recipients.
Because recipients might differ in their priors, or their abilities to update be-
liefs, information provision could negatively affect some recipients’ decisions
while helping others. This can create or contribute to inequality between recip-
ients. This paper studies whether people are willing to provide information
even when that leads to an unequal outcome, which they dislike. To do so,
two large incentivized experiments are run in which Americans decide if they
want to provide information. The findings of both experiments give robust
causal evidence that people have the attitude that information provision is a
∗Meissner: Department of Economics, NHH Norwegian School of Economics. I would
like to thank Björn Bartling, Alexander W. Cappelen, Dirk Engelmann, Jana Friedrichsen,
Alex Imas, Erik Sørensen, Bertil Tungodden, and seminar participants in Bergen and Berlin
for helpful comments and discussions. Financial support from the Research Council of
Norway through its Centre of Excellence Scheme (FAIR project No 262675) is gratefully
acknowledged.
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moral obligation and that they accept an outcome which they dislike when
it is the consequence of information provision. The results further show that
people who highly value others’ autonomy are more likely to implement an
unequal outcome they dislike if it is the consequence of information provision.
This suggests that respect for autonomy is an important source of the moral
obligation to provide information.
Keywords: Inequality acceptance, Information provision, Paternalism
JEL Classification: D63, D64, D82
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1.1 Introduction
Companies, governments and people must frequently decide how much
information they want to provide (Bar-Gill et al., 2019). Examples include
sellers of financial services who decide how much information about their
products they provide to potential buyers (Bolton et al., 2007), governments
deciding how much information to give to citizens to achieve policy goals
(Altmann et al., 2018), or doctors and teachers who have to choose how
much information to reveal to patients and students (Caplin and Leahy,
2004). Information provision is often presented as an important obligation
to respect people’s "right to know" and their autonomy (Sunstein, 2020).
However, information provision is not always helpful for recipients (Ben-
Shahar and Schneider, 2011; Sunstein, 2019a). It is increasingly clear that
decisions to provide information can sometimes negatively impact decision
quality, thereby causing losses for some recipients (Lipnowski et al., 2020;
Persson, 2018; Roberts, 2017).
Recent empirical work has documented negative consequences of informa-
tion provision on decisions and welfare for some recipients in a wide range
of settings, including financial information (Campbell, 2016; Frydman and
Wang, 2020; Medina, 2018), or information about energy usage (Allcott and
Kessler, 2019). Different explanations for some recipients’ losses have been
introduced in the literature. Most prominently, a large body of literature
has shown that people who hold specific priors or have low abilities to cor-
rectly update beliefs based on new information can be hurt by information
provision. For example, Andrade et al. (2019) present a case in which new
information about monetary policy is beneficial to part of the recipients as it
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helps them form more accurate beliefs about future economic circumstances.
Yet, they show that the same information can cause others, who hold dif-
ferent prior beliefs, to become overly optimistic or pessimistic and adjust
expectations about macroeconomic variables and investment behavior in a
non-optimal way. Dohmen et al. (2009) further show that a large number of
people are unable to draw correct inference from new information because
they suffer from base-rate neglect, thereby not correctly accounting for the
base-rate probability of an event. Base-rate neglect can shift some recipients’
actions too strongly into the direction that the new information suggests,
thereby contributing to worse decision-making (Benjamin, 2019; Hare et al.,
2011; Trevino, 2020). For example, Hirshleifer (2001) presents evidence that
some investors suffer from base-rate neglect and therefore overreact to new
information, leading to worse trading-decisions and lower returns for them
while other investors correctly adjust beliefs based on the new information.
Because information provision can negatively affect the outcome of some
but create gains for others, it potentially creates or contributes to inequalities
in wealth and income. Sunstein (2016) argues that it is important to consider
the distributive consequences of information provision because they can
influence decision-makers in their choice of how much information they
want to provide. Previous research has shown that a majority of people are
averse to inequality (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt (1999)) and that for a large share
of the population, preferences for equal outcomes can outweigh efficiency
considerations (e.g., Alesina and Giuliano (2011); Almås et al. (2020); Engel-
mann and Strobel (2004)). These preferences have an impact on individual
choices, for example the decision how to distribute earnings between par-
ties (e.g., Cappelen et al. (2007, 2013b); Charness and Rabin (2002); Konow
(2003)). This suggests that people might be averse to the unequal outcome
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that information provision produces. Consequently, they might prefer to
withhold information even when provision would increase overall efficiency.
A broad literature in philosophy and ethics argues that people might want
to provide information to others for non-consequentialist reasons. People
could believe that withholding information from others infringes upon their
autonomy to freely choose how to make use of it (Bok, 1989; Cox and Fritz,
2016; Epstein et al., 2010; Fallis, 2018; Harris and Keywood, 2001; Kymlicka,
2002; Schick, 1994). They could contend that people are freer with infor-
mation (Sunstein, 2020). As previous research has shown, people highly
value others’ autonomy and prefer measures that are autonomy preserving
or enhancing (Jung and Mellers, 2016; Reisch and Sunstein, 2016). Further,
people might perceive withholding information as infringing upon others’
right to know (Floridi, 2010; Holley, 1998; Zimmerman and Bradley, 2019).
This attitude has already shaped important policy decisions, leading to the
increasing prevalence of transparent information provision policies (Bennear
and Olmstead, 2008; Berliner, 2014). For these reasons, people might see
information provision as a moral obligation. As a result of this attitude, they
could be willing to provide information and accept an unequal outcome
which they dislike if it resulted from information provision.
This paper explores whether people are willing to provide information even
when this produces an unequal outcome which they dislike. It reports from
two large-scale incentivized studies which are conducted to investigate if
people are willing to provide information even when that leads to an un-
equal outcome which they dislike. In total, more than 3000 participants from
general population samples of the United States took part in the two studies.
The participants act as impartial third-parties (spectators) and make a choice
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that has real distributive consequences for two workers. In each study, there
are two conditions in which spectators make a choice that results in either
the equal but inefficient, or the unequal but efficient distribution of earnings
for the two workers.2,3 Spectators are randomly selected into one of the two
experimental conditions. In the baseline condition, spectators can directly
implement either the unequal or the equal outcome. Measuring which out-
comes participants prefer to implement in this condition reveals the share
of participants who prefer the equal outcome and the share who prefer the
unequal one. In the treatment condition (information treatment), the par-
ticipants can indirectly implement the exact same outcomes through their
choice whether to provide or withhold information. Spectators are informed
that information provision leads to the unequal outcome while withholding
information results in the equal one. Spectators in the baseline condition and
the information treatment receive the same information about the payout
consequences of their actions. As participants are randomly assigned to base-
line condition and information treatment, distributive preferences should
on average be the same in the two treatments. Therefore, the comparison of
the share of participants who decide to provide information with the share
of participants who directly choose the same unequal outcome makes it
possible to identify whether participants perceive information provision as a
moral obligation and are willing to accept an unequal outcome which they
dislike in order to respect that obligation. If a larger share of participants pro-
vide information than directly implement the unequal outcome, this would
show that some participants who prefer the equal outcome are still willing to
provide information that leads to the unequal outcome. This would suggest
2Throughout the paper, efficiency refers to the situation in which the sum of individual
payouts is maximized(Güth et al., 2003).
3The equal but inefficient allocation is referred to as the equal outcome while the unequal
but efficient allocation is called the unequal outcome.
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that some participants accept the unequal outcome if it is the consequence
of information provision, and thus gives evidence for the existence of the
attitude that information provision is a moral obligation.
In both studies, spectators in the information treatment must decide how
much information to provide. Each study investigates one crucial setting
in which information can lead to losses for some recipients and gains for
others. The first study focuses on differences in priors. Spectators are told
that the decision to provide additional information will negatively impact
one worker and increase the earnings of the other due to the differences
in prior information that the workers had. It was random which prior in-
formation workers received; therefore the distribution of gains and losses
depends on luck. The second study focuses on differences in the ability to draw
correct inference from new data. Spectators are informed that the provision
of additional information will harm the earnings of a worker who suffers
from base-rate neglect and increase those of the other who does not. In the
baseline conditions of both studies, spectators can directly implement the
same payout consequences for the two workers who differ either in luck
(study 1) or ability (study 2). Investigating whether people are willing to
provide information in two important settings in which information provi-
sion leads to losses for some but gains for other recipients makes it possible
to understand whether the attitude that information provision is a moral
obligation robustly exists in different situations. The experimental designs
and main hypotheses are pre-registered at the AEA RCT registry.4
The results of both studies show that the share of participants who implement
the unequal outcome is significantly higher in the information treatment
compared to the baseline condition. In the first study, 62 percent of partici-
4Study 1: AEARCTR-0003376 , Study 2: AEARCTR-0005018
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pants choose to provide the workers with additional information, thereby
implementing the unequal outcome. In the baseline condition, 40 percent
of participants are willing to implement the unequal outcome for the two
workers directly. In the second study, 40 percent of participants choose to
provide additional information, producing the unequal outcome. 31 percent
of participants choose the unequal distribution of earnings in the baseline
condition. These findings suggest that people have the attitude that infor-
mation provision is a moral obligation and that, to respect that obligation,
they are willing to accept the unequal outcome which they dislike. However,
in both studies, a substantial share of participants are willing to withhold
information when that produces the equal outcome for the two workers.
The two studies provide evidence for demographic heterogeneity in the
attitude that information provision is a moral obligation. Furthermore, the re-
sults suggest that there is a link between people’s attitude towards autonomy
and their attitude that information provision is a moral obligation. Partici-
pants, who state that they believe that the government should not restrict
citizens’ freedom even when that is in their best interest are more likely to
provide information that leads to an outcome which they dislike than partici-
pants who believe the opposite. This result supports the interpretation that
people’s attitude that information provision is a moral obligation is linked to
their intrinsic valuation of autonomy and suggests that this obligation might
be a consequence of their respect for autonomy.
This paper contributes to the growing literature in economics and psychology
(e.g., Benartzi et al. (2017); Sharot and Sunstein (2020); Sunstein (2016)) that
investigates how distributive concerns influence information provision. This
study is the first to show that people have the attitude that a moral obligation
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for information provision exists and that, in order to respect that obligation,
they accept an unequal outcome which they dislike if it is the consequence
of information provision. By showing that a significant share of people
are willing to accept an unequal outcome which they dislike when it is
the consequence of information provision, this paper adds novel insight
into this literature by offering a new foundation for the widespread use of
information provision. This finding suggests that at least a fraction of people
perceive it as a moral obligation to provide information. This might justify
policy initiatives which focus on providing citizens with more information
even when their distributive outcomes are undesirable (Bao and Ho, 2015;
Loewenstein and Chater, 2017). However, a large share of participants are
willing to withhold information when that leads to the equal outcome that
they prefer for the potential recipients. A large literature has shown that
distributive preferences are linked to policy preferences (Alesina et al., 2018;
Almås et al., 2020; Fisman et al., 2017; Roth and Wohlfart, 2018). This finding
should therefore caution policy makers as it could suggest that, even though
a significant fraction perceives information provision as a moral obligation,
a large share of people are willing to withhold information because they are
averse to the outcome information provision would produce.
This paper further introduces a new approach to studying people’s attitude
towards information provision. While previous papers (e.g., Khalmetski et
al. (2017); Serra-Garcia et al. (2011); Sheremeta and Shields (2017)) focused on
situations in which people had a monetary incentive to provide or withhold
information, this study presents a framework in which people’s decision
whether to provide information only influences other people’s earnings
(Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido, 2012). This allows to cleanly iden-
tify whether information provision is at least partially driven by a moral
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obligation instead of strategic or monetary considerations. Understanding
this makes it possible to study situations in which outcomes of information
providers are not directly influenced by their decision whether to provide
information, for example, government agencies which provide information
on energy usage.
The findings of this paper further contribute to the literature on social pref-
erences. Overall, the results of this paper are in line with previous work
that demonstrates that preferences for equal outcomes can outweigh effi-
ciency considerations (e.g., Almås et al. (2020)). Furthermore, a large body of
literature has shown that people’s preferences over distributive outcomes
for others influence their decisions (e.g., Almås et al. (2010); Andreoni and
Miller (2002); Cappelen et al. (2013b); Durante et al. (2014); Fehr and Schmidt
(1999)). This study provides evidence that for a substantial share of people,
the moral obligation to provide information can influence their acceptance
of distributive outcomes which they dislike. Comparing the share of par-
ticipants who are willing to provide information with the share that are
willing to directly implement the same outcome provides causal evidence
that some people accept unequal outcomes which they dislike when they are
the consequence of information provision. This finding reveals that people
are willing to trade-off their aversion to inequality with the moral obligation
to provide information. However, the studies also provide evidence that peo-
ple’s preference for an equal outcome can justify withholding information,
emphasizing the importance of distributive preferences in the decision to
provide information.
The findings further add to a small but growing literature in economics that
shows how people’s valuation of their own and other people’s autonomy can
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influence important decisions they make (Ambuehl et al., 2019; Bartling et al.,
2014; Bobadilla-Suarez et al., 2017; Fehr et al., 2013). The result of the present
study suggest that there is a link between the intrinsic valuation of autonomy
and the moral obligation to provide others with information. People who
value other’s autonomy highly are more likely to accept outcomes which
they dislike if they are the consequence of information provision. This
suggests that respect for autonomy is an important source of the attitude
that information provision is a moral obligation, thus suggesting that people
use information provision as a way to give others autonomy. The findings of
the present paper illustrate that the intrinsic valuation of other’s autonomy
can influence people’s behavior in their role as information providers.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the first study in
more detail. In the third part of the paper, the second study is presented.
Section four concludes the paper.
1.2 Study 1
1.2.1 Experimental design
The first study focused on a situation in which the information recipients
hold different priors and, for this reason, information provision leads to
monetary gains for one and losses for the other recipient. Two types of
participants took part in the study, spectators and workers. Spectators were
informed that in contrast to a hypothetical survey question, their decision
might have real consequences for other people. Spectators were randomly
assigned to one of two treatments and made an incentivized decision that,
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with a certain probability, determined the earnings of two workers. In the
baseline condition of the experiment, spectators had the choice to directly
implement either the equal or the unequal earnings distribution for the
two workers. In the information treatment, they had to decide whether
they wanted to provide or withhold information from the two workers.
Spectators were informed that their decision would, given that people follow
the information they receive, have equivalent payout consequences as the
decision in the baseline condition. Withholding information would result in
the equal outcome for the two workers while providing information would
lead to the unequal outcome. Experimental design and main hypotheses
were pre-registered at the AEA RCT-Registry.
Spectators
Spectators were recruited in collaboration with the market research company
Dynata. 2419 spectators from a general population sample of the United
States took part in the study. Spectators were informed that their decision
might be implemented.5 Spectators were broadly representative of the adult
population of the United States across age, income and location in census
regions. The median age of participants was 45. About 52.5 percent of
participants were women. Table 1.7 in the appendix provides an overview
of the characteristics of the participants. The spectators were randomly
assigned to one of two treatments. 1212 spectators were assigned to the
baseline condition and 1207 participants were assigned to the information
treatment. Table 1.8 in the appendix shows that treatment assignment was
balanced on observable characteristics.
5The matching from spectators to pairs of workers was 1:20.
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Workers
In total 242 workers were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk. 122 workers
were assigned to the baseline condition and 120 workers were assigned to
do the information task.6 Two workers were paired with each other. In the
baseline condition, spectators had to answer a few survey questions. Their
earnings were determined by the decision that spectators made for the pair
of workers. In the information task, workers had to complete a guessing task
in which they had to estimate the share of red balls in an urn. Their earnings
depended on the accuracy of their estimate.
Treatments
In the baseline condition, spectators could directly implement either an
equal or an unequal outcome for the two workers. They were presented
with one option that would lead to the pair of workers being paid $3.30
for their participation in an experiment. Alternatively, spectators could
choose to change these payments to $5.00 for one and $2.50 for the other
worker. Making that change resulted in an overall increase in payouts but
introduced inequality between the two workers. Spectators in this treatment
were explicitly informed that the allocation of gains and losses from the
change was random and due to luck.
In the information treatment, spectators had to make the choice if they
wanted to provide additional information. They were presented with a
situation in which two workers had to estimate the share of red balls in an
urn. They were informed that the earnings of the workers depended on the
6The median age of the workers was 35 years. 41.3 percent of workers identified as
female.
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accuracy of their estimate. If the worker correctly estimated the share of red
balls in the urn, he or she would earn $5.00. The information from the initial
draws that the pair of workers received would put both workers equally far
off the correct solution, by presenting either a share of red balls of 33 percent
or 67 percent. Each percentage point off the correct 50 percent solution lowers
the worker’s earnings by $0.10. Therefore, given that workers follow the
information suggested by their prior information, both would earn $3.30
because they are 17 percentage points away from the correct solution.
Spectators had the choice whether they wanted to present the initial draw
or draw an additional ball from the urn and present it to the worker. The
additional information from the draw would always result in one worker
seeing a 50 percent share of red balls instead of the 33 percent or 67 percent
they received in the initial draw while the other either sees a 25 percent or
a 75 percent share.7 Spectators were told that, given that they follow their
information, one worker’s earnings will increase from $3.30 to $5.00 (moving
from 17 percentage points deviation to 0 percentage points) while the others’
decrease from $3.30 to $2.50 (moving from 17 percentage points deviation to
25 percentage points).8 Adding the additional ball would therefore lead to an
increase in overall payouts but would also cause inequality between the two
workers. The worker who gains from the additional information earns an
additional $1.70 if he or she follows the information while the other worker
loses $0.80. Spectators were further informed that, equivalent to the baseline
condition, the color of the additional ball and therefore the distribution of
gains and losses was random and not due to ability or effort.
7In the initial draw, one worker is presented with the draw that resulted in 2 blue and
1 red ball while the other receives information about the draw that resulted in 2 red and 1
blue ball. If the fourth ball is red, this would result in 3 blue and 1 red (25 percent) for the
first while the other gets the result for the draw that resulted in 2 red and 2 blue ball (50
percent). The equivalent is true if the additional ball is blue.
8The modal responses of workers was equal to the information spectators received.
26
The appendix contains the full instructions to spectators. Further, informa-
tion on age, gender, education, household income and attitudes towards
paternalism of spectators were collected.
1.2.2 Empirical strategy
In both treatments, the share of spectators who implemented the unequal
outcome was measured. Luck as a source of inequality was kept constant
across treatments. Spectators in the information treatment were informed
that, given that participants follow the information they receive, their de-
cision would lead to the exact same payout consequences as the lottery in
the baseline condition.9 To identify whether people are willing to accept an
unequal outcome which they dislike when it is the consequence of informa-
tion provision, choices between the baseline condition and the information
treatment are compared. Measuring the share of spectators who directly
implement the unequal outcome in the baseline condition reveals the share
of participants who prefer the efficient over the equal outcome. In the infor-
mation treatment, the same outcomes are the result of the decision whether
to provide information. Due to random assignment to treatment, distribu-
tive preferences of spectators should not vary between baseline condition
and information treatment. This makes it possible to causally identify if a
significant fraction of people are willing to accept an unequal outcome which
they dislike when it is the consequence of information provision. If the share
of spectators who provide information is higher than the share who directly
implements the same outcome, that would show that some spectators who
prefer the equal outcome are still willing to provide information that leads
9See instructions for exact description.
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to the unequal outcome. This finding would suggest that these participants
have the attitude that information provision is a moral obligation and that, to
respect that obligation, they accept the unequal outcome which they dislike.
This outcome provides a lower bound for the prevalence of people who have
the attitude that information provision is a moral obligation. It might be that
among participants who prefer the unequal outcome and participants who
implement the equal outcome in the information treatment, some still have
the attitude that information provision is a moral obligation.
To test whether the distributions of participants’ choices between baseline
condition and information treatment differed, a χ2-test is performed. The
results of the χ2-test reveal whether the share of participants who chose to
implement the equal and the share of participants who chose to implement
the unequal outcome are different between baseline condition and informa-
tion treatment. Further, an OLS-regression with the following specification is
run:
Yi = β0 + β1Informationi + βXi + εi, (1.1)
where Yi is an indicator variable for the decision that leads to the unequal
outcome and Informationi is an indicator variable for assignment to the
information treatment. All control variables, Xi are included as binary vari-
ables which are 1 if the participant is above the median in that demographic
variable (or is female).
When excluding the control variables, β0 measures the share of participants
who implement the unequal distribution in the baseline condition. Therefore,
β0 identifies how large the share of spectators who prefer the unequal and
efficient outcome over the equal one is. 1 − β0 measures the share of par-
ticipants who prefer the equal outcome. The share of participants who are
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willing to implement the unequal outcome in the information treatment is
β0 +β1. 1−β0−β1 measures the share of participants who withhold informa-
tion to achieve an equal outcome. β1 reveals the treatment effect. Given the
assumptions that spectators believe that the payout consequences of informa-
tion provision are as described to them and that preferences for outcomes on
average do not differ between the two treatments due to randomization, β1
allows to identify whether information provision causally impacts people’s
willingness to accept the unequal outcome which they dislike. β1 is the
difference between baseline condition and information treatment in the share
of participants who implement the unequal outcome. If β1 is positive and
significantly different from 0, this provides causal evidence that a significant
fraction of participants are willing to provide information even when they
would prefer the equal outcome. This is interpreted as evidence for the
existence of the attitude that information provision is a moral obligation as
it would show that participants who prefer the equal outcome accept the
unequal one when it is the consequence of information provision.
In addition, differences in treatment effects between demographic groups
are analyzed. Analyzing whether the treatment effects vary across different
demographic groups makes it possible to show if there are differences in peo-
ple’s willingness to provide information that leads to the unequal outcome
which they dislike based on demographics. Understanding this could help
to uncover whether certain demographic variables are linked to people’s
attitude that a moral obligation to provide information exists.
The following regression to analyze the heterogeneous treatment effects is
run for each of the demographic background variables:
Yi = β0 + β1Informationi + β2xi + β3xiInformationi + βXi + εi, (1.2)
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Yi is an indicator variable for the decision to implement the unequal dis-
tribution of earnings. Informationi is an indicator variable for treatment
assignment. xi is the demographic variable which is tested and Xi is a vector
of all other demographic variables. Variables xi that are tested are (i) age, (ii)
income, (iii) gender and (iv) education.
β1 measures the treatment effect for participants for whom the tested variable
is 0. The treatment effect on participants who are above median in the tested
variable or female is measured as β1 + β3. β3 gives insight into whether the
size of the treatment effect differs between the low/high categories in that
variable or between males and females respectively.
People’s attitude that information provision is a moral obligation might also
be driven by moral attitudes. One potential source of this might be respect
for the autonomy of recipients. Restricting access to information could be
perceived as a violation of this autonomy because withholding informa-
tion takes other’s freedom to decide how to respond to it (Kozlowski and
Sweanor, 2016). Therefore, OLS regression 1.2 was run to test whether the
size of the treatment effect is associated with participants’ attitudes towards
autonomy. This finding would suggest the attitude that information provi-
sion is a moral obligation is linked to people’s attitude towards autonomy.
Participants’ attitudes towards autonomy were elicited with the question
of whether they support government restrictions of freedom if that would
be in the citizens’ best interest. For participants that stated that they do not




Figure 1.2 provides an overview of spectator decisions. Overall, 51.1 percent
Figure 1.1: Study 1 - Share of spectators who choose the unequal distribution
Note: The figure shows the share of spectators in the baseline condition and the
information treatment who chose the alternative that leads to the unequal outcome
for the two workers. The bars show 95% confidence intervals.
of participants chose to implement the unequal distribution of earnings for
the workers. There are large differences in the share of spectators who chose
the unequal outcome between treatments. 40.1 percent of participants chose
to implement the unequal distribution in the baseline condition while 62.2
percent of participants did so in the information treatment.
The results of the main analysis reveal a significant difference in the partici-
pants’ choices between the information treatment and the baseline condition.
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The χ2-test for differences in the distributions between the two conditions is
highly significant (p < 0.001, χ2 = 117.63).
Table 1.1 shows the results of regression 1.1.
Table 1.1: Regression results for implemented inequality
Inequality Inequality Inequality Inequality Inequality Inequality
Information 0.221∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗









Constant 0.401∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.025)
Observations 2410 2410 2410 2410 2410 2410
R2 0.049 0.070 0.050 0.053 0.049 0.076
Note: The table reports results from an OLS-regression of the share of spectators who
implement the unequal outcome for the two workers. Information is an indicator
variable which takes the value 1 if the participant was assigned to the information
treatment. Age is an indicator variable with the value 1 if the participant was
older than 45 years. Income is an indicator variable which is 1 if the participant
was above the median household income ($60,000) in the sample. Female is an
indicator variable for being female. Education is an indicator variable which is 1
when the participant has at least some college education. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Column 1 shows a large and significant (p < 0.001) difference in the willing-
ness of spectators to implement the unequal distribution of earnings between
baseline condition and information treatment. The result of the baseline con-
dition reveals that approx. 60 percent of participants prefer the equal to the
efficient outcome. The share that implements this outcome declines signifi-
cantly when participants must withhold information to achieve equality. β1
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shows that the fraction of spectators who are willing to provide information
that leads to inequality is 22.1 percentage points higher than the share of
spectators who directly implement this outcome. This parameter is virtually
unaffected by the inclusion of background variables as shown in columns
2-6. This leads to the following results:
Result 1: More participants are willing to implement the unequal outcome in
the information treatment than in the baseline condition.
The increase in the share of participants who prefer the unequal outcome
indicates that out of approx. 60 percent of participants who prefer an equal
distribution of earnings, about one third is willing to accept the unequal
and efficient outcome if it is the consequence of information provision. This
result suggests that a substantial fraction of participants hold the attitude that
information provision is a moral obligation.10 However, 38.8 percent of par-
ticipants in the information treatment withhold information to produce the
equal distribution of earnings between the two workers. This demonstrates
that a large share of participants are still willing to withhold information if
that results in the equal distribution of income for the two workers that they
prefer.
Result 2: A large share of participants withholds information to produce the equal
outcome for the two workers.
Columns 2 – 6 further suggest that there are differences in the willingness to
10Participants had to complete two challenging attention checks in the experiment. All
tests are also run with a sample which excludes participants who failed both attention checks
in the survey. The instructions of the attention checks are available in the appendix part
C. Appendix table 1.11 shows the regression results for this sample. The findings of this
robustness check confirm the findings of this analysis.
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implement the unequal outcome between groups. Columns 2 and 4 show
that older participants and women are significantly less likely to implement
the unequal distribution. The result for women is in line with previous
research which shows that women are on average more inequality averse
than men (Capraro, 2020; Croson and Gneezy, 2009).
Heterogeneity Analysis
Table 1.2 shows the results of the analysis for heterogeneity across demo-
graphic subgroups. Across all subgroups, the parameter for the assignment
Table 1.2: Regression results for heterogeneity across demographic groups
Inequality
Age Income Gender Education
B = 1 if > 45 B = 1 if > $ 60,000 B = 1 if female B = 1 if college
Information 0.139∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
B*Information 0.151∗∗∗ 0.015 0.033 0.089∗∗
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
B -0.251∗∗∗ 0.008 -0.092∗∗∗ -0.032
(0.027) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029)
Constant 0.556∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗ 0.526∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026)
β1 + β2 0.290∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
R2 0.083 0.076 0.076 0.078
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2410 2410 2410 2410
Note: The table reports results from an OLS-regression of the share of spectators who
implement the unequal outcome for the two workers. Information is an indicator
variable which takes the value 1 if the participant was assigned to the information
treatment. B is an indicator variable which is 1 when the participant is older than
45 (Column 1), has an household income higher than $60,000 (Column 2), is female
(Column 3) or has at least some college education (Column 4). B*Information are
interactions between assignment to the information treatment and the respective de-
mographic variable. β1 + β2 is the linear combination of the variables B*Information
+ Information. Control variables include all other demographic variables. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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to the information treatment remains large and significant. Figure 1.3 in
the appendix illustrates this finding. Across all groups, the share the treat-
ment effect is significantly bigger than 0. That shows that in all groups, a
substantial fraction are willing to accept the unequal outcome which they
dislike when it is the consequence of information provision. The increase in
shares of participants who implement the unequal outcome between baseline
condition and information treatment ranges from 13.9 percentage points for
participants who are younger than 45 to 29.0 percentage points for partici-
pants who are older than that age. This suggests that the finding that people
have the attitude that information provision is a moral obligation is robust
across demographic subgroups. Further, there is significant heterogeneity
in treatment effects across some demographic subgroups. The increase in
the share of spectators who implement the unequal distribution between
baseline condition and the information treatment is significantly larger for
older participants compared to younger individuals (p < 0.001). The same is
true for better educated participants compared to less educated participants
(p = 0.022). There is no evidence for differences in treatment effects between
women and men and high- and low-earning participants.
Result 3: The treatment effect is significantly stronger among older participants
and college-educated participants compared to younger and non-college-educated
participants.
52.3 percent of the younger participants prefer to implement the efficient
outcome in the baseline condition. This share increases to 66.6 percent
in the information treatment. Only 28.3 percent of participants who are
older than 45 implement the unequal outcome in the baseline condition.
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This share more than doubles in the information treatment. 57.4 percent of
older participants decide to provide information that leads to the unequal
outcome. This finding suggests that there is a link between age and the
attitude that information provision is a moral obligation. In this study, the
increase in the share of participants who implement the unequal outcome
increases significantly stronger for older participants, suggesting that they
perceive a stronger obligation to provide information. However, the share of
older participants who prefer the unequal outcome is still smaller than the
equivalent share among younger participants.
Among college-educated participants, the share of participants who im-
plement the unequal outcome increases from 38.6 percent to 65.6 percent
between baseline condition and information treatment. 41.5 percent of non-
college-educated participants implement the unequal outcome in the baseline
condition. This share increases to 58.8 percent in the information treatment.
This result suggests that higher education correlates with a stronger attitude
that information provision is a moral obligation.
The same analysis is run with the sample that excludes participants who
failed both attention checks in the study. Table 1.12 in the appendix shows
the full results. The finding that people across all subgroups are willing to
accept the unequal outcome which they dislike when it is the consequence
of information provision is confirmed by these findings. However, the
difference in the treatment effect between college-educated and non-college-
educated participants becomes statistically insignificant.
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The role of autonomy
Table 1.3 reports results for the analysis of heterogeneity in treatment effects
depending on participants’ attitudes towards autonomy. Column 1 shows










β2 + β3 0.265∗∗∗
( 0.025)
R2 0.090 0.094
Control Variables Yes Yes
Observations 2410 2410
Note: The table reports results from an OLS-regression of the share of spectators
who implement the unequal outcome for the two workers. Information is an in-
dicator variable which takes the value 1 if the participant was assigned to the
information treatment. Non-Paternalist is an indicator variable which is 1 if partici-
pants either strongly disagreed, disagreed or slightly disagreed with the statement
"The federal government should restrict citizens’ freedom if it is in the citizens’
own best interests". In total 1470 participants disagreed with this statement. Non-
Paternalist*Information is an interaction variable between assignment to the in-
formation treatment and participants’ attitudes towards paternalism. β2 + β3 is
the linear combination of the variables Non-Paternalist*Information + Information.
Control variables include all demographic variables. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
that participants who state higher support for government paternalism are
more likely to implement the unequal outcome. Column 2 shows the result
of OLS-regression 1.2. It shows that both groups, people that support gov-
ernment intervention and people who oppose it, are willing to accept the
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unequal outcome which they dislike when it is the consequence of informa-
tion provision. The share of participants who are willing to implement an
unequal outcome increases more strongly between baseline condition and
information treatment for participants who highly value autonomy.
Result 4: The treatment effect is significantly stronger among participants who
highly value autonomy compared to participants who do not.
The increase in the share who provide information compared to the share that
directly implements the same payout consequences is approximately twice
as large for them than for participants who indicate that they value outcomes
over autonomy. Among people who support government restrictions of
freedom if this is in the person’s best interest, 52.8 percent implement the
unequal outcome in the baseline condition. In the information treatment,
66.6 percent do so. Among participants who highly value autonomy, the
share who implement the efficient outcome increases from 32.4 percent to
59.2 percent. Result 4 suggests that there is a connection between people’s
valuation of autonomy and their attitude towards information provision.
The result is in line with the idea that providing others with information is
perceived as a way to give them the opportunity to freely make decisions,
indicating that respect for the autonomy of others could be an important
source of the attitude that information provision is a moral obligation.




While the first study investigated a situation in which information provision
leads to inequality between recipients due to differences in their priors,
this study focused on a situation in which information provision leads to
inequality due to differences in the ability to correctly update beliefs between
the two recipients. As in the first study, two types of participants were
recruited to take part in the survey. The first type, spectators, made decisions
that affected the monetary outcomes for the second type, workers. Spectators
knew that they made choices that might have real consequences for two other
people, a pair of workers. The study had two treatments and spectators were
randomly assigned to one of them. As in the first study, spectators’ choices
in the baseline condition revealed their preferences for either the equal or
the unequal outcome for the pair of workers. In the information treatment,
spectators made the choice whether to provide or withhold information from
the workers. In line with the first study, information provision would lead to
the unequal outcome while withholding information resulted in the equal
distribution of income. The experimental design and the main hypotheses
were pre-registered at the AEA RCT-Registry.
Spectators
The study was conducted together with Norstat. 1004 participants from a
general population sample of the United States were recruited for the study.
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Spectators were informed that their decision might have real consequences.11
Table 1.9 in the appendix presents demographics of the participants. Com-
pared to the first study, participants in this study were slightly older. The
median age of participants was 55. Further, the share of female participants
was slightly higher in this study. 58.3 percent of participants were women.
About 39.6 percent of participants identified as Republican. 501 participants
were assigned to the baseline condition while 503 were assigned to the in-
formation treatment. Table 1.10 in the appendix shows that the treatment
assignment was balanced on most observable characteristics.
Workers
Workers were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk. First, their ability to
correctly estimate the probability of an event based on base-rate and addi-
tional information was pre-tested. 45 workers who suffered from base-rate
neglect (incorrectly answer in the pre-test) and 45 Bayesian (correct answer
in the pre-test) workers were identified and took part in the main task.12 Low
(base-rate neglecters) and high ability (Bayesians) workers were matched to
pairs. 23 pairs were assigned to the information treatment and 22 pairs to the
baseline condition. Workers’ bonuses in both treatments depended on their
pre-tested ability to correctly update their beliefs as they had to complete
the same task. In the task, workers had to guess the probability of a lottery
ticket paying out. The task that workers had to solve could be either simple
or more complex. Workers were paid based on the accuracy of their estimate
about the probability of the lottery ticket paying out.
11The matching from spectators to pairs of workers was 1:21.
12The median age of participants was 35. 46.7 percent of participants identified as female.
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Treatments
In both treatments, the spectators were informed that they made a decision
that affected a pair of workers in which one had a high ability to solve the
complex task and one worker had a low ability to do so. Spectators in both
treatments were told that abilities were pre-tested. In the two treatments,
they decided which version of the task to assign to the pair of workers. In
neither treatment did spectators know the exact task that the workers were
asked to do.13 Expected payout consequences of the choices of spectators
were kept the same as in the first study.
In the baseline condition, spectators were presented with the choice which
math task they want to assign to a pair of workers. Spectators could directly
implement either the simple or the complex version of the math task.14 Spec-
tators were told that in the simple version of the math task, given workers
pre-tested abilities, both would perform equally well while in the complex
math task the high ability worker would be able to correctly solve the prob-
lem while the low ability worker would be unable to do so. Assigning the
simple task would result in both workers earning $3.30 while the high ability
worker would gain $1.70 to earn $5.00 in the complex task and the low ability
worker would lose $0.80 to earn $2.50 based on their pre-tested abilities.
Therefore, implementing the simple task leads to the equal outcome while
implementing the complex task results in unequal earnings.
In the information treatment, spectators made the choice how much informa-
13See appendix for full instructions to the spectators.
14In the simple version of the task, workers only received information that lottery tickets
like this have a base-rate probability to pay out that is 5 percent. In the more complex version,
the workers additionally received information that a scanner with 90 percent sensitivity and
specificity tested the ticket and predicted that it is a winning ticket.
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tion they want to provide to the pair of workers. Spectators had to decide if
they wanted to only provide the base-rate probability or provide base-rate
and additional information to the two workers. Their decision whether to
withhold or provide information lead to the simple or complex version of the
math task. They were informed that providing additional information would,
given the pre-tested abilities, enable high ability workers to correctly update
their beliefs about the probability of the lottery ticket paying out while the
low ability worker would drastically overestimate the probability of the
ticket winning.15 Given that both workers only receive information about the
base-rate probability when the spectator decides to withhold information,
this version of the task does not require updating. Spectators were therefore
informed that the equal performance of the two workers would result in
both of them earning $3.30. They were also told that their decision to provide
information would, given the workers’ abilities, increase the earnings of the
high ability worker to $5.00, a gain of $1.70 while lowering them to $2.50,
a loss of $0.80 for the worker with low abilities. Therefore, spectators were
presented with two options in the information treatment that lead to the
same payout consequences as the choice in the baseline condition.
The appendix contains full instructions to the spectators. Further, infor-
mation on age, gender, household income and education were elicited. To
understand whether political differences are linked to the attitude that infor-
mation provision is a moral obligation, participants were asked to state their
party preference.
15In the sample, only high ability workers were able to correctly solve the complex task.
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1.3.2 Empirical strategy
The share of spectators who made a decision that lead to the unequal distribu-
tion was measured in both conditions. Ability as the source of inequality was
kept constant across the two treatments. Measuring spectators’ choices in the
baseline condition made it possible to understand participants’ preferences
for outcomes in this scenario. Spectators’ decision to assign the simple math
task is interpreted as a preference for the equal over the efficient outcome
while the opposite is true for spectators that assign the complex math task.
Payout consequences of the decision to provide or withhold information
and assign the simple or complex math task were described in the same way
to the spectators in the information treatment and the baseline condition,
respectively. Spectators were told that withholding information would lead
to the equal outcome while information provision would result in the un-
equal outcome. Comparing whether more participants are willing to provide
information than to directly implement the unequal outcome makes it possi-
ble to measure whether people are willing to accept the unequal outcome,
which they dislike when it is the consequence of information provision. This
finding would be interpreted as evidence that these people have the atti-
tude that information provision is a moral obligation and that, to respect
that obligation, they provide information even though they prefer the equal
outcome. Therefore, this study makes it possible to identify the existence
of the attitude that information provision is a moral obligation. However,
the study only provides a lower bound for the prevalence of this attitude.
Its prevalence among participants who already prefer the unequal outcome
and participants whose aversion to inequality is sufficiently strong cannot be
measured.
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To study whether differences between choices in the two treatments exist,
the distribution of choices in the baseline condition (simple or complex task)
is compared to the distribution of choices in the information treatment (base-
rate, or base-rate and additional information) with a χ2-test. To further
measure whether a difference between choices in the baseline condition and
the information treatment exists, the following OLS-regression is run:
Yi = β0 + β1Informationi + βXi + εi, (1.3)
where Yi is 1 when the spectator makes a decision that leads to the unequal
outcome. Informationi is an indicator variable for assignment to the infor-
mation treatment. All control variables, Xi, are included as binary variables
which are 1 if the participant is (i) older than 45, (ii) has a yearly household
income above $60,000, (iii) is female and (iv) is college educated. That is
equivalent to the groups in the first study.
In the regression without control variables, β0 measures the share of spec-
tators who implement the complex math task. This share is interpreted as
participants who prefer the efficient over the equal outcome for the two
workers. 1− β0 is the share of participants who implement the simple math
task which, based on pre-tested abilities, leads to the equal outcome for the
two workers. The share of participants who decide to implement the unequal
outcome in the information treatment is β0 + β1. The fraction of participants
who are willing to withhold information, thereby implementing the equal
outcome, is 1− β0 − β1. β1 measures the treatment effect. If participants in
the baseline condition and the information treatment believe that payout
consequences of their choices are as described to them and that, due to ran-
dom assignment, the share of participants who prefer the equal outcome
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is the same in both treatments, β1 makes it possible to measure if people’s
acceptance of an unequal outcome depends on whether it is the consequence
of information provision. If β1 is significantly larger than 0, this indicates
that a significant fraction of participants who prefer the equal outcome are
willing to provide information. This would suggest that these participants
have the attitude that information provision is a moral obligation and that, to
respect that obligation, they accept the unequal outcome which they dislike.
Furthermore, the robustness of the treatment effect across different sub-
groups is investigated. This analysis allows to better understand whether
demographic variables are linked to participants’ willingness to accept the
unequal outcome which they dislike when it is the consequence of informa-
tion provision. For this purpose, the following OLS-regression is run:
Yi = β0 + β1Informationi + β2xi + β3xiInformationi + βXi + εi, (1.4)
Yi is an indicator variable for the implementation of the unequal distribu-
tions of earnings, Informationi is an indicator variable for assignment to the
information treatment and xi is the demographic variable which is tested. Xi
is a vector of all other demographic variables.
In the regression without control variables, β1 offers a measure for the treat-
ment effect among participants for whom xi is 0. The linear combination of
β1 and β3 measures the treatment effect for participants for whom xi is 1. If
β3 is significantly different from 0, that provides evidence for differences in
treatment effects between different demographic groups. This finding would
suggest an association between this demographic variable and people’s
attitude that information provision is a moral obligation.
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Study 1 provided evidence that people’s intrinsic valuation of autonomy
constitutes an important source of the moral obligation to provide informa-
tion. This study analyzes whether this relationship is closely linked to party
preferences. Previous research has shown that Republicans are more likely to
accept outcomes of voluntary choices (Jost et al., 2009, 2003) and are opposed
to interventions into these outcomes (Skitka, 1999; Skitka and Tetlock, 1993).
Therefore, the OLS-regression 1.4 is run which tests whether Republicans
are more willing to provide information that leads to the unequal outcome
which they dislike than non-Republicans. In this regression, the variable
xi is an indicator variable for Republicans. The interaction effect between
Informationi and xi allows to measure whether the willingness to provide
information that leads to the unequal outcome which that they dislike varies
between Republicans and non-Republicans.
1.3.3 Results
Main analysis
Figure 2 displays the shares of spectators who chose to implement the un-
equal outcome. Overall, 36.0 percent chose to implement the unequal dis-
tribution of earnings for the workers. The share of spectators who chose
to provide additional information (40.8 percent) is higher than the share of
spectators who assigned the complex math task (31.1 percent).
A χ2-test provides strong evidence that the two distributions of choices are
significantly different between information treatment and baseline condition
(p = 0.001, χ2 = 10.08). Table 1.4 shows the results of OLS-regression 1.3.
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Table 1.4: Regression results for implemented inequality
Inequality Inequality Inequality Inequality Inequality Inequality
Information 0.096∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗









Constant 0.311∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.029) (0.024) (0.028) (0.024) (0.039)
Observations 1004 1004 1004 1004 1004 1004
R2 0.010 0.018 0.017 0.019 0.010 0.030
Note: The table reports results from an OLS-regression of the share of spectators who
implement the unequal outcome for the two workers. Information is an indicator
variable which takes the value 1 if the participant was assigned to the information
treatment. Age is an indicator variable with the value 1 if the participant was older
than 45 years. Income is an indicator variable which is 1 if the participant was above
a household income of $60,000. Female is an indicator variable for being female.
Education is an indicator variable which is 1 when the participant has at least some
college education. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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Figure 1.2: Study 2 - Share of spectators who choose the unequal distribution
Note: The figure shows the share of spectators in the baseline condition and the
information treatment who chose the alternative that leads to the unequal outcome
for the two workers. The bars show 95% confidence intervals.
Overall the results show that a majority of participants in both treatments
prefer the equal income distribution to the efficient one. However, there is
a large and significant (p < 0.001) difference in the share of spectators who
implement the unequal distribution between the baseline condition and the
information treatment. The share of spectators who provide additional in-
formation is 9.6 percentage points higher than the share of participants who
assign a complex math task. Columns 2 - 6 show that this parameter is almost
unaffected by the inclusion of demographic control variables. Summarized,
this leads to:
Result 5: More participants are willing to implement the unequal outcome in
the information treatment than in the baseline condition.
48
In the baseline condition, about 70 percent of participants indicate that they
prefer an equal to an efficient outcome. This share decreases to approx. 60
percent in the information treatment. This suggests that a significant fraction
of people who are averse to inequality are willing to accept an unequal out-
come if it is the consequence of information provision. This result provides
robust evidence for the existence of the attitude that information provision is
a moral obligation. Fewer people are willing to implement an equal outcome
for two workers if that would require that they withhold information. How-
ever, in this study, a large majority is still willing to withhold information.
Result 6: A large share of participants withholds information to produce the equal
outcome for the two workers.
This finding underlines the importance of distributional preferences in the
decision to provide information. In the setting where inequality is due to
differences in abilities, a majority of spectators prefer that less information is
provided.
Together with the results of the first study, this shows that the moral obliga-
tion to provide information can influence people’s decisions across different
settings. Comparing the findings to the first study reveals a somewhat
smaller treatment effect and overall lower levels of spectators implementing
the unequal earnings for the two workers. This finding might be explained
by differences in the source of inequality. Previous research (e.g., Almås et al.
(2020)) has shown that the source of inequality matters for people’s attitude
towards it. In this setting, spectators might be more averse to inequality
which is the result of innate ability compared to luck. This could be due to
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beliefs which spectators hold about the affected groups. They might perceive
people with low abilities as more vulnerable and are therefore averse to
losses for this group. It is striking that a majority of spectators are willing to
withhold information in the setting where information provision would neg-
atively impact low ability workers. The overall lower levels might, however,
also be driven by differences in samples between the first and the second
study.
Column 2 further shows that older participants are significantly more likely
(p = 0.004) to implement the unequal earnings distribution. Column 3 reveals
that the share of high income participants who implement the unequal earn-
ings is significantly (p = 0.007) higher than that of low income individuals.
Column 4 shows that, in line with a larger literature, women are significantly
(p = 0.003) less likely to implement the unequal distribution than men.
Heterogeneity Analysis
Table 1.5 shows the regression results for the analysis of heterogeneity in
treatment effects across different demographic groups. Across all subgroups,
the parameter for the assignment to the information treatment is positive. Yet,
not all of the parameter are significant. Figure 1.4 in the appendix displays
this finding. The smallest increase in the share of participants who implement
the unequal outcome happens among college-educated participants. 35.7
percent prefer the unequal outcome in the baseline condition. This share
increases to 37.6 percent in the information treatment. The highest increase is
among non-college-educated participants for whom the share who prefer the
unequal outcome increases from 27.4 percent to 43.8 percent. In all groups, a
majority of participants prefer to withhold information however.
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Table 1.5: Regression results for heterogeneity across demographic groups
Inequality
Age Income Gender Education
B = 1 if > 45 B = 1 if income > $ 60,000 B = 1 if female B = 1 if college
Information 0.072 0.162∗∗∗ 0.068 0.165∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.041) (0.048) (0.041)
B*Information 0.049 -0.120∗∗ 0.062 -0.132∗∗
(0.062) (0.060) (0.062) (0.061)
B 0.050 0.128∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗ 0.035
(0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.045)
Constant 0.307∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042)
β1 + β2 0.121∗∗∗ 0.043 0.130∗∗∗ 0.034
(0.038) (0.044) (0.039) (0.044)
R2 0.031 0.034 0.031 0.035
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1004 1004 1004 1004
Note: The table reports results from an OLS-regression of the share of spectators who
implement the unequal outcome for the two workers. Information is an indicator
variable which takes the value 1 if the participant was assigned to the information
treatment. B is an indicator variable which is 1 when the participant is older than 45
(Column 1), has a household income higher than $60,000 (Column 2), is female (Col-
umn 3) or is college-educated (Column 4). B*Information are interactions between
assignment to the information treatment and the respective demographic variable.
β1 + β2 is the linear combination of the variables B*Information + Information. Con-
trol Variables include all other demographic variables. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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There is evidence for significant heterogeneity in treatment effects. Partici-
pants without college education and low income have a significantly higher
treatment effect than participants with college education and with high in-
come. There is no evidence for heterogeneity between younger and older
and men and women.
Result 7: The treatment effect is significantly stronger among non-college-educated
and low-income participants compared to college-educated and high-income partici-
pants.
This outcome suggests that among lower income and lower education partic-
ipants, a higher share is willing to accept a distribution which they dislike
when it is the consequence of information provision. This finding could
suggest that these variables are associated with a stronger attitude that infor-
mation provision is a moral obligation.
Taken together, the results of the two studies suggest that demographic
variables might be linked to people’s attitude that information provision is
a moral obligation. This comparison also makes clear however that more
research is needed to provide a conclusive picture which variables interact
with this attitude.
Political preference
The first study revealed that participants’ preferences for autonomy over
outcomes can influence their willingness to provide information that leads
to an unequal outcome which they dislike. Previous research has shown
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that Republicans are more likely to emphasize the importance of personal
autonomy and tend to reject restrictions that protect people from the conse-
quences of their choices (Janoff-Bulman, 2009; Skitka et al., 2002). Therefore,
party preferences might be associated with people’s willingness to accept
the unequal outcome which they dislike when they are the consequence of
information provision. Column 2 of Table 1.6 shows if this association exists.










β1 + β3 0.148∗∗∗
(0.048)
Observations 1004 1004
Control Variables Yes Yes
R2 0.036 0.037
Note: The table reports results from an OLS-regression of the share of spectators who
implement the unequal outcome for the two workers. Information is an indicator
variable which takes the value 1 if the participant was assigned to the information
treatment. Republican is an indicator variable which is 1 when the participant self-
identifies as Republican. Republican*Information is an interaction variable which
is 1 when the participant is Republican and assigned to the information treatment.
β1 + β3 is the linear combination of Republican*Information and Information. Con-
trol Variables include all other demographic variables. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Column 1 provides evidence that Republicans are more likely to implement
the unequal outcome for the two workers (p = 0.036). While across treatments
32.8 percent of non-Republicans implement the unequal distribution of in-
come, this share is 40.7 percent among Republicans. This finding matches
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the existing literature as it suggests that Republicans are more concerned
about efficiency compared to equality than non-Republicans (Cappelen et
al., 2018a,b; Kerschbamer and Müller, 2020). In the baseline condition, 29.3
percent of non-Republicans are willing to make a decision that leads to
the unequal outcome. This share significantly increases to 36.2 percent in
the information treatment. For Republicans, the increase between baseline
condition and information treatment is almost twice as large. The share
of participants who implement the unequal outcome increases from 33.8
percent to 48.2 percent. However, column 2 shows no significant difference
in the treatment effect between Republicans and non-Republicans (p = 0.250).
Result 8: There is no evidence for a difference in the treatment effect between
Republicans and non-Republicans.
Further, even among Republicans, a majority are still willing to withhold
information when that results in the equal outcome for the two workers.
1.4 Concluding remarks
This paper reports results of two large-scale incentivized studies with two
demographically diverse samples which measure whether people provide
information even when that leads to an unequal outcome which they dislike.
Comparing the shares of spectators who provide information that leads to
the unequal outcome with the share of spectators who directly implement
the same outcome makes it possible to causally identify if participants are
willing to implement the unequal outcome which they dislike when it is
the consequence of information provision. Across studies, spectators are
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significantly more likely to implement the unequal outcome when it is the
consequence of information provision rather than implementing it directly.
Thus, the findings of the two studies support the hypothesis that at least some
people have the attitude that information provision is a moral obligation
and that, to respect that obligation, they provide information even when
that leads to the unequal outcome which they dislike. This outcome robustly
holds for two different mechanisms with which information provision can
lead to gains for some and losses for other recipients. However, important
differences between the results of the two studies exist. In particular, the
relatively high willingness of participants to withhold information in the
second study where that protects a low ability worker shows that, in certain
situations, people are still opposed to the inequality that is the result of
information provision. This result shows that aversion to inequality can
shape people’s decision whether to provide or withhold information. Future
research is needed to better understand how situational factors determine
the impact of people’s aversion to inequality on their willingness to provide
information.
The results of the two studies suggest that the attitude that information
provision is a moral obligation is robust across demographic groups. There
is some heterogeneity between groups in the willingness to provide informa-
tion when that leads to the unequal outcome which they dislike. However,
the comparison between studies does not make it possible to draw general
conclusions about which groups are more willing to do so. Given that the
two studies do not consistently allow to link demographic variables to the
attitude that information provision is a moral obligation, it is unclear whether
such links exists. This could be in line with the idea that this attitude is not
only heterogeneous across but also within individuals and could depend
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on the parameters of the situation (Gibson et al., 2013; Mazar et al., 2008).
More research is needed to understand how demographic and situational
factors interact in determining whether people perceive a moral obligation
to provide information.
Exploratory results show that the intrinsic valuation of autonomy might be
one source of the attitude that information provision is a moral obligation.
The present results suggest that people perceive a moral obligation to provide
information because they see it as a means to enable others to make their
own decisions based on this information. This finding is in line with a large
literature in philosophy and ethics that posits a close link between access to
information and autonomy. This extends the result that people value policies
which provide information in part because they are autonomy-preserving
(e.g., Camerer et al. (2003)) as it suggests that they perceive these policies as
autonomy-enhancing.
To study whether preferences for information provision in the study are as-
sociated with the participants’ attitudes towards information provision more
generally, spectators in the second study were presented with a hypothetical
scenario in which a firm had to decide whether to provide simple or detailed
information to consumers.16 As shown in tables 1.13 and 1.14 in the appendix,
a χ2-test reveals that participants’ choices in the information treatment are
closely linked to their preferences in the hypothetical scenario while their
choices in the baseline condition are not. Table 1.15 in the appendix presents
results from an OLS-regression for participants in the information treatment.
This analysis shows that participants who provided information in the study
are more likely to support detailed information provision than participants
16The description of the hypothetical choice is available in the appendix and is similar to
the scenario in Newell and Siikamäki (2014).
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who withheld information in the study. These findings suggest that informa-
tion provision in the study is tightly associated with more general attitudes
of people towards information provision in different circumstances.
The findings of the present paper might inform the literature on lying costs.
As suggested in Cappelen et al. (2013a) and reflected in a wider literature in
philosophy, people might see withholding information as akin to lying and
could therefore value the provision of information as an important moral
obligation. The results of this paper support the idea that people have the
attitude that information provision is a moral obligation. As a consequence
of this moral obligation, people could be unwilling to falsify or withhold in-
formation they have regardless of the outcome which that behavior produces
(Abeler et al., 2019; Cappelen et al., 2013a; Erat and Gneezy, 2012; Gneezy et
al., 2018; Kerschbamer et al., 2019; López-Pérez and Spiegelman, 2013; Shalvi
and Leiser, 2013). Yet, in both studies, a significant share of participants are
willing to withhold information from others. This suggests that some people
are willing to withhold information to produce the distributive outcome they
prefer. This opens an interesting future avenue for research to understand
how situational factors influence people’s attitude that information provi-
sion is a moral obligation and potentially their willingness to lie. Future
studies could investigate whether people are willing to lie if that results in
a distributive outcome which they prefer. The present paper introduces a
suitable experimental framework to approach this research question.
While this paper establishes the existence of the attitude that information pro-
vision is a moral obligation, several questions remain unanswered. Future
research could try to link other moral attitudes with this moral obligation
(Cappelen et al., 2013a). As the literature in philosophy posits, people might
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perceive information provision as a contribution to a wider public good
(Floridi, 2013). Understanding if this motive is a source of people’s attitude
that information provision is a moral obligation could provide an important
insight into people’s decision-making with regards to information provision.
Further, while this study does not show a significant link between partici-
pants’ attitude that information provision is a moral obligation and party
affiliation, studying whether other political views influence this attitude
could offer important insight. To gain a deeper understanding of the factors
determining people’s attitude towards information provision, it could fur-
ther be necessary to understand if cultural factors are linked to the moral
obligation to provide information.
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1.A Overview
The following appendix presents demographic variables about the partici-
pants in the two studies (part A), additional results (part B), the instructions
that were provided to the participants (part C) and shows and explains
deviations from the pre-analysis plan (part D).
1.B Demographics
Table 1.7: Descriptive Statistics - Study 1
Number of participants Share
Household income less than or equal to $30,000 618 0.26
Household income between $30,001 and $60,000 608 0.25
Household income between $60,001 and $100,000 531 0.22
Household income between $100,001 and $150,000 337 0.14
Household income above $150,000 325 0.13
High School Education or below 727 0.30
Some College Education 515 0.21
Bachelor or equivalent 801 0.33
Master or equivalent 376 0.16
Between 18 and 34 years old 752 0.31
Between 35 and 44 years old 441 0.18
Between 45 and 54 years old 401 0.17
Between 55 and 64 years old 400 0.17




Note: The table shows demographic information about all participants in the first study.
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Table 1.8: Descriptive Statistics - Treatments Study 1
Baseline Information Difference
Household income less than or equal to $30,000 0.25 0.26 -0.01
Household income between $30,001 and $60,000 0.26 0.24 0.02
Household income between $60,001 and $100,000 0.21 0.23 -0.02
Household income between $100,001 and $150,000 0.14 0.14 0.00
Household income above $150,000 0.14 0.13 0.01
High School Education or below 0.32 0.29 0.03∗
Some College Education 0.21 0.21 -0.00
Bachelor or equivalent 0.32 0.34 -0.02
Master or equivalent 0.15 0.16 -0.01
Age in years 46.46 45.87 0.59
Female 0.53 0.52 0.02
Non-Paternalist 0.62 0.59 0.03
Observations 1212 1207
Note: The table shows the share of participants in the demographic categories and the mean
for the category age in years. Differences were tested with t-tests. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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Table 1.9: Descriptive Statistics - Study 2
Number of participants Share
Household income less than or equal to $30,000 264 0.26
Household income between $30,001 and $60,000 249 0.25
Household income between $60,001 and $100,000 226 0.23
Household income between $100,001 and $150,000 164 0.16
Household income above $150,000 101 0.10
High School Education or below 232 0.23
Some College Education 303 0.30
Bachelor or equivalent 261 0.26
Master or equivalent 208 0.21
Between 18 and 34 years old 199 0.20
Between 35 and 44 years old 143 0.14
Between 45 and 54 years old 146 0.15
Between 55 and 64 years old 238 0.24
Older than 64 years 278 0.28
Female 585 0.58
Observations 1004
Note: The table shows demographic information about all participants in the second study.
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Table 1.10: Descriptive Statistics - Treatment Study 2
Baseline Information Difference
Household income less than or equal to $30,000 0.25 0.27 -0.02
Household income between $30,001 and $60,000 0.26 0.24 0.02
Household income between $60,001 and $100,000 0.21 0.24 -0.03
Household income between $100,001 and $150,000 0.18 0.15 0.03
Household income above $150,000 0.10 0.10 -0.00
High School Education or below 0.24 0.22 0.01
Some College Education 0.32 0.29 0.03
Bachelor or equivalent 0.25 0.27 -0.02
Master or equivalent 0.20 0.22 -0.02
Age in years 53.40 49.91 3.50∗∗∗
Female 0.58 0.59 -0.01
Republican 0.41 0.38 0.03
Observations 501 503
Note: The table shows the share of participants in the demographic categories and the mean




Table 1.11: Regression results for implemented inequality - Reduced sample Study 1
Inequality Inequality Inequality Inequality Inequality Inequality
Information 0.286∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗









Constant 0.244∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.025) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.036)
Observations 1299 1299 1299 1299 1299 1299
R2 0.086 0.088 0.086 0.088 0.086 0.091
Note: The table reports results from an OLS-regression of the share of spectators who
implement the unequal outcome for the two workers. Information is an indicator
variable which takes the value 1 if the participant was assigned to the information
treatment. Age is an indicator variable with the value 1 if the participant was older
than 45 years. Income is an indicator variable which is 1 if the participant was above
a household income of $60,000. Female is an indicator variable for being female.
Education is an indicator variable which is 1 when the participant has at least some
college education. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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Figure 1.3: Treatment effects for different subgroups - Study 1
Note: The figure shows the effect size for the information treatment across different demo-
graphic subgroups. Effect size is measured in standard deviations. Grey bars indicate group
younger than 45 (age), below $60,000 household income (income) and non-college educated
(education) and male (gender). Red bars are older than 45 (age), above $60,000 household
income (income) and college educated (education) and female (gender). The bars show the
95% confidence interval.
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Table 1.12: Regression results for heterogeneity across demographic groups - reduced
sample Study 1
Inequality
Age Income Gender Education
B = 1 if > 45 B = 1 if income > $ 60,000 B = 1 if female B = 1 if college
Information 0.220∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.037) (0.039) (0.037)
B*Information 0.109∗∗ 0.021 0.075 0.067
(0.053) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
B -0.132∗∗∗ -0.013 -0.092∗∗∗ -0.016
(0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035)
Constant 0.347∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037)
β1 + β2 0.329∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.036) (0.034) (0.036)
R2 0.095 0.091 0.092 0.092
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1299 1299 1299 1299
Note: The table reports results from an OLS-regression of the share of spectators who
implement the unequal outcome for the two workers. Information is an indicator
variable which takes the value 1 if the participant was assigned to the information
treatment. B is an indicator variable which is 1 when the participant is older than
45 (Column 1), has a household income higher than $60,000 (Column 2), is female
(Column 3) or has at least some college education (Column 4). B*Information are
interactions between assignment to the information treatment and the respective de-
mographic variable. β1 + β2 is the linear combination of the variables B*Information
+ Information. Control variables include all other demographic variables. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 1.4: Treatment effects for different subgroups - Study 2
Note: This figure shows the effect size for the information treatment across different demo-
graphic subgroups. Effect size is measured in standard deviations. Grey bars indicate group
younger than 45 (age), below $60,000 household income (income) and non-college educated
(education) and male (gender). Red bars are older than 45 (age), above $60,000 household
income (income) and college educated (education) and female (gender). The bars show the
95% confidence interval.
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Table 1.13: Overview of choices in the information treatment and the hypothetical choice
Hypothetical choice









Note: The table shows an overview of people’s choices in the information treatment and the
choices they make in the hypothetical scenario. The share of participants who make a given
decision in the information treatment in parentheses. χ2-test for equality of distributions: p
= 0.003.
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Table 1.14: Overview of choices in the baseline condition and the hypothetical choice
Hypothetical choice
Simple information Detailed information
Baseline
condition
Simple math task 38(11.0%)
307
(89.0%)
Complex math task 20(12.8%)
136
(87.2%)
Note: The table shows an overview of people’s choices in the baseline condition and the
choices they make in the hypothetical scenario. The share of participants who make a given
decision in the baseline condition in parentheses. χ2-test for equality of distributions: p =
0.559.
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Table 1.15: Regression results for choice in hypothetical scenario
Detailed provision Detailed provision





Control variables No Yes
Observations 503 503
Note: The table provides results from an OLS-regression for people’s support for detailed
information provision of a firm. Only participants in the information treatment were
included. Information provider is an indicator variable for the choice to provide information
in the experiment. Control variables include all other demographic variables. Robust





We now ask you to make a choice that might have consequences for a real
life situation.
We are recruiting individuals via an international online market place to
take part in a study for which they are paid. These individuals are ran-
domly matched into pairs. You are now making a decision for one randomly
selected pair of individuals. We plan to pay both 3.30 USD for their partici-
pation.
We ask you now to make the following decision: You can decide that we
randomly select one of the two individuals to earn 5.00 USD, 1.70 USD more
than before. The other individual then earns 2.50 USD, 0.80 USD less than
before.
Your decision will be implemented with a certain probability and there-
fore might have real consequences.
I want to implement the alternative earnings
I do not want to implement the alternative earnings
70
Information treatment
We now ask you to make a choice that might have real consequences for a
real life situation.
We are recruiting individuals via an international online market place to
take part in a study in which they are asked to estimate the share of red balls
in a container with a large number of red and blue balls. Their earnings in
the study are determined by the precision of their estimate. The real share
of red balls in the container is 50% and they earn 5.00 USD if their estimate
is correct. Their earnings are reduced by 10 cents per percentage point their
estimate differs from the correct number.
Two individuals, let us call them individual A and individual B, are matched
in a pair. Each individual will see a result of three random draws from the
container. One ball is drawn at a time, the color is reported to the individual
and the ball is put back into the container.
The situation in which you are asked to make a decision is the following:
Individual A has seen a draw of 2 red and 1 blue ball (a share of 67% red
balls) while individual B has seen 2 blue and 1 red ball (a share of 33% red
balls). Based on the three draws, Individual A estimates that the share of red
balls is 67% (a 17 percentage point deviation from the correct number) while
individual B estimates that the share of red balls is 33% (a 17 percentage point
deviation from the correct number). If this is their final estimate, individual
A earns 3.30 USD and individual B earns 3.30 USD.
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We now ask you to decide whether or not you want to show the two in-
dividuals the color of one additional ball that is randomly drawn. If you
do, one of the two individuals will have seen 2 red and 2 blue balls while
the other individual will have seen 3 balls of one color and and 1 of the
other color. Based on the four balls, one individual will estimate that the
share of red ball is 50% (no deviation) and the other individual will esti-
mate that the share of red balls is either 25% or 75% (a 25 percentage point
deviation). One individual will therefore earn 5 USD, 1.70 USD more than
before and the other individual will earn 2.50 USD, 0.80 USD less than before.
Your decision will be implemented with a certain probability and there-
fore might have real consequences.
I want to show them the additional ball
I do not want to show them the additional ball
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Paternalism
To what extent do you agree to the following statement: The federal gov-












Many people think it is a difficult and exhausting task to fill out online sur-
veys with questions about a broad variety of situations. It is hard to stay
focused and to keep your up your attention. To indicate that you still actively
follow our survey, simply click on the arrow without answering the question
to go to the next page.




There always a big competition for our focus and our cognitive bandwidth
in general is very limited. Studies report that the maximum time we can
continuously pay attention is only about 7 minutes. To proceed to the next
question and indicate your full level of attention please click on the only an-
swer option constituting an even number, ignoring what the actual question
is about.









We now ask you to make a choice that might have consequences for a real
life situation. We have recruited two individuals, let us call them individual
A and individual B, to take part in a study in which they have to solve math
problems. They will both be paid a fixed amount for participating, but they
can earn additional money depending on how well they did in the math task.
Previously, we have tested their math abilities and we want you to decide
which math task they have to solve. They can either do a simple math task
or a more complicated task. If you give them the first task then based on
the result from the previous test, individual A and individual B will be able
complete the task and both will earn $3.30. If you give them the second
task then individual A, but not individual B, will be able to complete the
task. Individual A will then earn $5.00, $1.50 more than in the first task and
individual B will earn $2.50, $0.80 less than in the first task.
Please indicate your decision now:
I want to implement the first task
I want to implement the second task
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Information treatment
We now ask you to make a choice that might have consequences for a real
life situation. We have recruited two individuals, let us call them individual
A and individual B, to take part in a study in which they have to assess the
likelihood that a certain event happens based on the information given to
them. They will both be paid a fixed amount for participating, but they can
earn additional money depending on how well they did in the task.
Previously, we have tested their abilities and we want you to decide how
much information to present to the participants. They can either be given
basic information or basic and additional information. If you provide basic
information on the likelihood of the event then based on the result from
the previous test, individual A and individual B will make equally good
predictions and both will earn $3.30. If you provide them with basic and
additional information on the likelihood, individual A will be able to use
this information to make a better prediction, but individual B will be unable
to use the additional information and make a worse prediction. Individual A
will then earn $5.00, $1.50 more than with basic information and individual
B will earn $2.50, $0.80 less than with basic information.
Please indicate your decision now:
I want to provide basic information
I want to provide basic and additional information
76
Hypothetical Choice
Producers of electronic devices, such as refrigerators and air conditioners,
have to present information about the energy efficiency of their products to
consumers. Such information can help consumers select the product that is
best for them. However, additional information might also result in some
consumers getting confused.
Consider a situation in which a producer is deciding whether to provide
more detailed information to its customers. This additional information will
help the majority of consumers when they decide which product to purchase,
but it will make this choice more difficult for a minority of consumers. In





1.E Deviations from the pre-analysis plan
The pre-analysis plan of the first study is available at AEARCTR-0003376.
In the main analysis, an OLS-regression was run to better illustrate the
main treatment effect. In the heterogeneity analysis, all control variables are
included. This inclusion does not change the conclusions of this analysis.
The pre-analysis plan for the second study is available at AEARCTR-0005018.
In this study, an OLS-regression was run for the main effect. Control variables
were included for the heterogeneity analysis. In this case, the inclusion does
not change the main conclusions either. For the external validity measure,
another OLS-regression was run to present the main result.
All additional tests were run to test the pre-registered hypothesis. Hypothe-
ses that were not pre-registered are made salient as "exploratory analysis" in
the main body of the paper.
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Chapter 2
Cancel the deal? An experimental
study on the exploitation of
irrational consumers
Alexander W. Cappelen Stefan Meissner
Bertil Tungodden∗
Abstract
Consumers are sometimes exploited because they misunderstand the value
of a product they buy. We present the results from a large-scale experimental
study that examines whether third-party spectators from the general popula-
tion in the US accept a deal where the irrational buyer pays more for a product
than it is worth and the extent to which the willingness to cancel such deals
depends on the seller’s role in the process leading up to the deal. We find
that the majority of the spectators cancel an unfair deal even when the seller’s
∗Affiliation of all authors: Department of Economics, NHH Norwegian School of Eco-
nomics. We have received valuable comments and suggestions from Björn Bartling, Eleonora
Freddi, Jana Friedrichsen, Alex Imas, George Loewenstein, and Erik Ø. Sørensen. We would
also like to thank Sebastian Fest, for excellent research assistance. The project was financed
by support from the Research Council of Norway through its Centres of Excellence Scheme,
FAIR project no 262675, and the Research Council of Norway research grants no 236995,
no 262636, and no 302145. The project was administered by FAIR - The Choice Lab, NHH
Norwegian School of Economics.
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role is limited to accepting a proposal made by the buyer. A large minority,
however, are willing to uphold the deal even when the seller has obfuscated
the value of the product and proposed the deal. The seller’s involvement in
obfuscating the buyer’s information significantly increases the willingness
to cancel the deal and to fine the seller. Our results shed new light on how
people view fairness in market transactions and their attitudes to government
regulation of businesses.




Consumers often make systematic mistakes in their valuation of products
(Heidhues and Kőszegi, 2018) and such mistakes have been documented
in numerous contexts, among them credit card contracts (Heidhues and
Kőszegi, 2010), life- and health-insurance (Bhargava et al., 2017; Gottlieb
and Smetters, 2016), cellular phone plans (Bar-Gill and Stone, 2012; Grubb,
2009), mortgages (Campbell et al., 2011), and financial investments (Choi
et al., 2010). Companies can exploit such mistakes to take advantage of
consumers (Agarwal et al., 2017; Akerlof and Shiller, 2015; Célérier and
Vallée, 2017; Gabaix and Laibson, 2006; Grubb, 2015; Ru and Schoar, 2016).
An important policy question is therefore whether the government should
introduce policies aimed at limiting the opportunities businesses have to
exploit ill-informed or irrational consumers (Agarwal et al., 2015; Bar-Gill and
Warren, 2008; Campbell, 2016; Kőszegi, 2014; Nuñez, 2017; Pete, 2014; Warren
and Wood, 2014). Such policies may be viewed as fair since they eliminate
market transactions that would not happen if both parties were well informed
and rational, but do at the same time reduce people’s freedom to enter
contracts (Epstein, 1975; Kronman, 1983). A large literature in economics,
philosophy, and law, has argued that a person’s autonomy is a valuable good
in itself and needs to be respected even if the person’s choices have adverse
consequences for him- or herself (Bartling et al., 2014; Cohen, 1995; Mill, 1859;
Nozick, 1974). Attitudes to such regulations thus depend on how people
trade off different types of moral considerations.
In this paper, we present the results from a novel large-scale experiment
designed to examine how the general population of the US views market
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transactions involving irrational buyers. About 4000 participants are pre-
sented with real situations in which a buyer has misunderstood the true
value of a product and agreed to pay more for the product than it is worth.
The participants, acting as third-party spectators, are asked to decide whether
the deal should be canceled. Spectators who decide to cancel the deal were
also given the opportunity to penalize the seller financially. In a between-
subject design, we vary the seller’s role in the process leading up to the deal,
while holding the consequences of canceling or not canceling the deal the
same. In a base treatment with low involvement, the seller has only accepted
a deal proposed by the buyer. In three additional treatments, the seller’s
involvement is increased either by the seller having proposed the deal, by the
seller having obfuscated the information about the true value of the product,
or both.
Our design allows us to cleanly identify people’s moral views on contracts
involving irrational buyers, and the extent to which such views depend on
the involvement of the seller. We identify three types of spectators, who differ
in the way they handle the trade-off between concern for the distributional
consequences of market transactions and concern for people’s autonomy:
Substantialists, Contractualists, and Proceduralists. Substantialist are spec-
tators who primarily care about the consequences of market transactions and
therefore want to cancel deals that create an unfair distribution of gains and
loses (Almås et al., 2020; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Cappelen et al., 2007,
2013b; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Contractualists are spectators who primarily
care about respecting individual autonomy and therefore do not want to
cancel any voluntary deals (Arneson, 1980; Brownell et al., 2010; Epstein,
1975; Schwartz and Scott, 2003; Spector, 2006). Finally, Proceduralists are
spectators who decide to cancel dependent on the seller’s role in the process
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leading up to the deal (Bolton et al., 2005; DiMatteo and Rich, 2005; Falk et
al., 2008).
Our study provides three main findings. First, we show that the majority of
spectators do not accept the exploitation of an irrational buyer, even when
the contract reflects a voluntary agreement. Pooled across treatments, 60.7
percent of the spectators decide to cancel the contract. Second, we find that
the involvement of the seller matters. In particular, the share of spectators
canceling the deal increases significantly when the sellers have obfuscated
the information given to the buyers, and it increases the share of spectators
imposing a fine on the seller. Third, we estimate that the large majority of
spectators are Substantialists, who focus on the unfair consequences of the
market transaction and cancel the deal even when the involvement of the
seller is minimal. We also find that a large minority are Contractualists, who
focus on the contract reflecting a voluntary agreement and do not cancel the
deal even when the seller has been actively involved in the exploitation of
the buyer. We only find a small minority of spectators being Proceduralists,
making the canceling of the deal conditional on the extent to which the seller
has been actively involved. Taken together, our findings show that there is
significant support for regulations of market transactions involving irrational
actors in the US population, and that there might be significant risk for
companies in pursuing strategies that exploit irrational consumers. However,
our study also shows that a large minority accept voluntary contracts even
when they have detrimental consequences for irrational buyers.
Our study relates to several literatures. It provides, to our knowledge, the
first experimental study of people’s attitudes to the exploitation of irra-
tional consumers, which has recently been studied theoretically in several
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important papers (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2004; Eliaz and Spiegler,
2006; Gabaix and Laibson, 2006; Heidhues and Kőszegi, 2018; Kőszegi, 2014).
These papers have demonstrated that the existence of irrational consumers
in a marketplace creates opportunities for companies to exploit them. Our
results suggest that the majority are in favor of initiatives that call for tighter
restrictions on contract terms and more comprehensive demands for infor-
mation disclosure (Pete, 2014; Seizov et al., 2019).
The results of this study also contribute to the literature on fairness in market
transactions. Previous research has shown that perceptions of unfair pricing
strategies can constrain a firm’s opportunity to maximize profits (Bolton et
al., 2003; Haitao Cui et al., 2007; Kahneman et al., 1986; Leibbrandt, 2020;
Xia et al., 2004; Zbaracki et al., 2004). Our study demonstrates that outcome-
based fairness considerations are of great importance for people’s view on
market transactions; a majority of the spectators decide to cancel a voluntary
deal that benefits one side at the expense of the other. We also show that
procedural-based fairness matters, by causally identifying that an increase in
seller involvement increases the share canceling the deal and the share fining
the seller. This is in line with previous research showing the importance of
both outcomes and processes for people’s assessment of fairness (Andreoni
et al., 2020; Brock et al., 2013; Falk et al., 2008).
Finally, our findings further add to the growing literature that investigates
the value of autonomy (Bartling et al., 2014; Fehr et al., 2013; Jacobsson
et al., 2007). Empirical evidence has shown that people value their own
and other people’s autonomy and are reluctant to infringe upon it (Bartling
et al., 2014; Fehr et al., 2013; Gagné and Deci, 2005; Iyer et al., 2012; Jung
and Mellers, 2016; Pikulina and Tergiman, 2020; Reisch and Sunstein, 2016).
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Consistent with these studies, our results show that a substantial share of the
spectators are unwilling to intervene when doing so can be seen as infringing
on people’s autonomy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the experi-
mental design and the sample, and Section 2.3 outlines the empirical strategy.
Section 2.4 presents the results, while Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Experimental Design
The experiment involved 5587 participants, recruited using two different
platforms. We recruited 3991 subjects from the general population in the
United States through a leading international survey provider (Dynata) to act
as third-party spectators, and we recruited 1596 subjects from the Amazon
Mechanical Turk (AMT) online labor market platform to serve as stakehold-
ers. The stakeholders were only recruited to create real economic situations,
and in the analysis, we focus on the decisions made by the spectators.
The spectators were largely representative of the adult population (+ 18 years
old) in the United States on observable characteristics (geographical location,
age, and gender). The median age of spectators was 48 years, 52 percent of
the sample were women, and the average level of education was somewhat
higher than in the general population. The median household income in
our sample was $60,000. Table 2.6 provides an overview of the demographic
characteristics of the spectators. In line with the pre-analysis plan, the survey
provider only included individuals in the sample if they passed an attention
check.2
2The pre-analysis plan is available at 10.17605/OSF.IO/N5HVB.
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Spectators were paid a fixed compensation for taking part in the study,
independent of their spectator decision. The spectators answered a set of
general questions about their background characteristics, including political
affiliation. We also asked the spectators about their beliefs about the behavior
of consumers and firms, and about their attitudes to government policies
aimed at restricting businesses’ opportunities to profit from customers who
misunderstand the value of a product or a service.
2.2.1 Spectator decision
Each spectator was matched to a buyer and a seller who had agreed to a
deal that would result in a loss for the buyer and a gain for the seller.3 All
spectators received the same basic description of the situation. They were
informed that a seller had been endowed with a product that had no value
for the seller but had a value of $2 for the buyer. Since there are no transaction
costs, this means that there is a small efficiency gain if the product is sold to
the buyer.
Both the seller and the buyer knew that product had no value for the seller.
The spectators were, however, told that there was an information asymmetry
between the seller and the buyer: only the seller knew that the value of the
product for the buyer was $2. The spectators were furthermore told that
the buyer had received complex information about the value of the product
for him- or herself and that, if the buyer had used the information correctly,
he or she could have calculated the correct value of the product. However,
3The spectators were told that there was a one-in-five chance that their choice would be
implemented for the pair they were matched with. The spectators also knew that the pair
they were matched with was aware that their earnings depended on the decision of another
person.
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using this information, the buyer had made a mistake when calculating the
value of the product and therefore believed that the value was $20. Finally,
the spectators were told that the seller knew that the buyer believed that the
value of the product was $20 and that the buyer and the seller had agreed on
a deal in which the buyer paid $10 for the product. As a result of the deal,
the buyer would lose $8 and the seller would gain $10.
Spectators were asked whether they wanted to cancel the deal. If they
decided to cancel the deal, the seller’s gain and the buyer’s loss would be
eliminated. Those spectators who decided to cancel the deal were asked
whether they wanted to fine the seller. If they decided to fine the seller, the
payment to the seller would be reduced by $2.
The spectators were randomly assigned to one of four treatments that only
differed in the how the deal between buyer and seller came about. Section
2.C in the appendix presents the full instructions for the spectators in each of
the four treatments.
2.2.2 Treatment variations
The four treatments varied with respect to the level of involvement of the
seller in proposing the deal and in obfuscating the information received by
the buyer. In the Low treatment, the seller was not active and only accepted
a proposal from the buyer. In this treatment, the spectators were told that
the buyer had proposed to buy the product for $10 and that the seller had
accepted this proposal. Furthermore, the spectators were informed that the
seller had no role in obfuscating the information the buyer received.
In the other treatments, we increased the seller’s involvement along two
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Note: This table provides an overview of the experimental treatments. In the treat-
ment Low, the seller’s involvement is limited to having accepted a proposal made
by the buyer. In the treatment Proposed, the seller has proposed the deal, but not
obfuscated the information. In the treatment Obfuscated, the seller has obfuscated
the information received by the buyer, but not proposed the deal. In the treatment
High, the seller has obfuscated the information and proposed the deal.
dimensions. The Proposed treatment is identical to the Low treatment except
that it was the seller who proposed the deal and the buyer who accepted it.
The Obfuscated treatment is identical to the Low treatment except that the
seller had decided to disclose information about the value of the product
to the buyer in a complex manner rather than in an easily understandable
manner. The seller knew that doing so would lead the buyer to overestimate
the value of the product. Finally, in the High treatment, the seller both
obfuscated the information about the value of the product and proposed the
deal. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the four treatments.
2.2.3 The stakeholders
To create the situations for which the spectators make decisions, we recruited
individuals on an online labor market platform to act as stakeholders. These
individuals were randomly assigned to the role of either a buyer or a seller.
The sellers received a product, a lottery ticket, and were informed that the
ticket had no value for themselves, but that it had a value of $2 for a buyer.
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They were asked whether they wanted to obfuscate the information about
the value of the ticket to the buyer. Sellers were informed that buyers who
received the complex information might make a mistake when calculating
the value and therefore overvalue the product.
The sellers who wanted to obfuscate the information given to the buyer were
then asked whether they wanted to offer to sell the lottery ticket for $10 to
a buyer who had overestimated the value of the product and whether they
would accept an offer of $10 from such a buyer. The sellers who wanted to
present in an easily understandable manner were asked whether they wanted
to offer the ticket for $10 to a buyer who had received complex information
from the experimenter and whether they would accept the same offer from
such a buyer.
The buyers were informed that the product had no value for the seller but
were given a complex description of the product that required them to make
some calculations to correctly evaluate its value. They were told that the
value of the product was either $20 or $2, and the description was given in
such a way that buyers who suffered from base-rate neglect would evaluate
the product at $20, while buyers who were Bayesian would correctly estimate
the value to be $2 (Benjamin, 2019). Buyers who estimated the value to be
$20 were asked whether they wanted to make an offer of $10 to a seller who
owned the product and whether they would accept an offer to purchase the
product for $10 from such a seller. Buyers who were unwilling to buy the
product for $10 were not matched with any seller.
Buyers and sellers who were willing to trade when the price was $10, were
matched in pairs to create the situations presented to the spectators. The
stakeholders were told that they could receive their bonus payments within
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a few days and that the bonus payment would be determined by their own
decisions and the decisions of a third party. All participants got a bonus of
$2, but the fine was subtracted from this amount for those sellers who were































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The empirical strategy was pre-registered at the repository of the Open
Science Foundation (OSF) before the data collection began.4 Pre-registration
included a power analysis, exclusion criteria for spectators, pre-specification
of the main hypotheses, and an outline of the empirical strategy.
2.3.1 Main specifications
To examine how the involvement of the seller affects the spectators’ willing-
ness to cancel the deal, we use the following empirical specification
Ci = β0 + β1Pi + β2Oi + β3PiOi + γXi + εi, (2.1)
where Ci is an indicator variable for whether the spectator canceled the deal,
Pi is an indicator variable for whether the seller proposed the deal, Oi is
an indicator variable for whether the spectator obfuscated the information,
PiOi is an interaction variable that captures a potential interaction effect
between the two domains of the seller’s involvement, and Xi is a vector for
control variables, including age, education, income, gender, and political
affiliation. As pre-registered, the main results are reported with and without
the inclusion of control variables. We expected that the willingness to cancel
would increase with the involvement of the seller, i.e. that β1 > 0 and that
β2 > 0, but had no prior hypothesis about the interaction effect β3.
We introduce the following classification of spectators, based on when they
4The pre-analysis plan is available at 10.17605/OSF.IO/N5HVB.
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would want to cancel the deal:
• Substantialists: Always cancel the deal
• Proceduralists: Do not cancel the deal if the seller is not active, but
cancel the deal if the seller has obfuscated information and proposed
the deal
• Contractualists: Never cancel the deal
We assume that all spectators are of one of these three types and that the
spectator type is independent of treatment. We can then estimate the share
of each type using (2.1):
• Substantialists: S = β0
• Proceduralists: P = β1 + β2 + β3
• Contractualists: C = 1− β0 − β1 − β2 − β3
We study heterogeneity in the willingness to cancel the deal using the back-
ground data collected in the survey. The heterogeneity analysis is conducted
by estimating the following regression:
Ci = β0+β1Bi+β2Pi+β3BiPi+β4Oi+β5BiOi+β6PiOi+β7BiPiOi+γXi+εi,
(2.2)
where Bi is an indicator variable for spectator i either having high education,
being female, having a household income that is higher than $60,000, being
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at least 47 years old or being a Republican. In this regression, Xi includes
all background variables except the variable captured by Bi. Using this
regression, we can also estimate the share of Substantialists, Proceduralists,
and Contractualists for the different subgroups.
To examine how the treatments affect the willingness to fine the seller, we
run 2.1 where we replace the indicator variable for the decision to cancel
with an indicator variable for whether the spectator fined the seller. The
heterogeneity analysis is conducted in the same way as for the decision to
cancel.
Treatment effects on the decision to fine can be driven by both the share
of spectators who cancel the deal and the share who fine conditional on
having canceled the deal. To shed light on the relative importance of these
mechanisms, we will also examine how the treatments affect the decision to
fine only using the respondents who decided to cancel.
2.4 Results
We first provide an analysis of the spectators’ decision to cancel the deal
between the buyer and the seller before we analyze the subsequent decision
to fine. Finally, we examine the spectators’ beliefs and policy attitudes.
2.4.1 The decision to cancel
Across treatments, we find that 60.7 percent of the spectators choose to cancel
the voluntarily agreed-upon deal between the buyer and seller. Figure 2.2
reports the share of spectators who choose to cancel the deal in each of the
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Figure 2.2: Share of spectators that cancel the deal
Note: The figure shows the share of participants who cancel the transaction between
the buyer and the seller in each of the four treatments. The standard errors are
indicated.
four treatments. We first observe that even in the Low treatment, where the
seller’s involvement is minimal, a majority of the spectators, 57.4 percent,
cancel the deal. This share increases somewhat, to 59.0 percent, in the Propose
treatment where the seller has proposed the deal. In the Obfuscate treatment
where the seller has obfuscated the information given to the buyer, the share
of spectators who cancel the deal further increases to 64.5 percent. Finally,
we observe that 62.3 percent of the spectators cancel the deal in the High
treatment, which implies that 37.7 percent do not cancel the deal even when
the seller has both obfuscated the information and proposed the deal. We
can summarize the first results as follows:
Result 1: A majority of spectators cancel a voluntary deal between an irrational
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buyer and a minimally involved seller. A large minority do not cancel a voluntary
deal between an irrational buyer and a seller even when the seller has obfuscated the
information to the buyer and proposed the price that exploits the irrationality of the
buyer.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 2.2 report regressions on the spectators’ decision
on whether to cancel the deal between buyer and seller. We observe that
the effect of having proposed the deal is not statistically significant (p =
0.464). However, the spectators’ willingness to cancel the deal is significantly
increased when the seller has obfuscated the information (p = 0.001), and
this holds independently of whether the seller has proposed the deal or not.
From column (2), we observe that these results hold when we control for
background characteristics. Table 2.3 furthermore shows that these results
hold for all subgroups. We can summarize these results as follows:
Result 2: Obfuscation of information by the seller increases the share of spectators
who cancel the deal. Spectator behavior is not affected by whether it is the seller or
buyer who proposes the deal.
From column (2) in Table 2.2, we also observe that female spectators and
older spectators are significantly more likely to cancel the deal (p < 0.001
and p < 0.001), while spectators with high income p < 0.001 and Republican
spectators (p < 0.030) are less likely to cancel the deal. The finding for
Republicans is in line with previous research that suggests that conservatives
are more likely to hold favorable views of the outcomes of free markets
(Goren, 2005; Jost et al., 2009, 2003; Malka et al., 2014) and are opposed to
interventions into these outcomes (Feldman and Johnston, 2014; Jost, 2017;
Skitka, 1999; Skitka and Tetlock, 1993).
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Table 2.2: Regression results for decision to cancel the deal and fine the seller
Cancel Cancel Fine Fine
Proposed 0.016 0.013 0.033∗∗ 0.033∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.015) (0.015)
Obfuscated 0.070∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.016) (0.016)
Proposed*Obfuscated -0.038 -0.037 -0.026 -0.024











Constant 0.574∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.022) (0.010) (0.016)
β1 + β2 + β3 0.049∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.016) (0.016)
β2 + β3 0.032 0.036∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.017) (0.017)
R2 0.003 0.022 0.009 0.015
Observations 3991 3991 3991 3991
Note: The table reports results from an OLS-regression of the share of spectators who
decides to cancel the deal (columns 1-2) and the share of spectators who decides
to fine the seller conditional on having canceled the transaction (columns 3-4).
"Proposed" is an indicator variable for the spectator being assigned to the treatment
where the seller proposed the transaction. "Obfuscated" is an indicator variable
for the spectator being assigned to the treatment in which the seller obfuscated
the information. "Propose*Obfuscate" is the interaction between "Proposed" and
"Obfuscated". "Female" is an indicator variable for being female. "College" is an
indicator variable for the spectator having a bachelor degree or higher. "Old" is
an indicator variable for the spectator being older than 47 years. "Income" is an
indicator variable for the spectator having a household income of more than $60,000
per year. "Republican" is an indicator variable for the spectator voting for the
Republican party. β1 + β2 + β3 is the linear combination of the parameters for
Proposed, Obfuscated and the interaction term between the two. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Turning to the analysis of the share of the different types of spectators,
reported in Figure 2.3, we find that a majority of the spectators, 57.4 percent,
are Substantialists who cancel the deal even when the seller only accepts an
offer made the buyer. We interpret these spectators as primarily caring about
the consequences of the deal and considering the outcome of the deal unfair.
A large minority, 37.7 percent, are Contractualists who do not cancel the
deal even when the seller has obfuscated the information and proposed the
deal. We interpret these spectators as primarily wanting to respect individual
autonomy. We cannot rule out the possibility that these spectators are also
motivated by a concern for efficiency, but given the small efficiency gain
associated with the deal, we find this less likely (Almås et al., 2020). Only
4.9 percent of the spectators are Proceduralists whose decision to cancel is
dependent on the extent to which the seller has been involved in the process
leading up to the deal. We interpret these spectators as mainly caring about
whether the process leading up to the deal was fair.
Figure 2.3 also displays the distribution of Substantialists, Proceduralists,
and Contractualists across the different subgroups. In all subgroups, the
majority of spectators are Substantialists and Contractualists make up about
a third of the spectators. There are some significant variations in the share
of the types, with the share of Substantialists significantly higher among
women and older spectators and spectators with low income (p = 0.001 and
p = 0.06), but the distribution of spectators types is strikingly similar across
subgroups.
Result 3: We find that the majority of the spectators are Substantialists and that a
large minority are Contractualists. Only a small minority are Proceduralists. The
distribution of spectator types is largely robust across subgroups.
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Figure 2.3: Classification of spectators
Note: The figure reports the estimated shares of spectators who are Substantialists,
Proceduralists, and Contractualists, for the full sample and for different subgroups.
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Figure 2.4: Share of spectators who fine the seller
Note: The figure reports the share of spectators who decides to fine the seller for
each of the four treatments. The standard errors are indicated.
2.4.2 The decision to fine
Spectators who canceled the deal may think that the seller deserves to be
punished for the role the he or she played in the process leading up to the
deal. The spectators who canceled the deal were therefore asked whether
they also wanted to impose a fine on the seller. Figure 2.4 reports the share
of spectators who, in addition to canceling the deal, decide to fine the seller.
Across treatments, 16.3 percent of spectators decide to fine the seller, but
there is considerable variation between treatments. In the Low treatment,
only 11.2 percent of the spectators fine the seller, while 20.0 percent of the
spectators decide to do so in the High treatment.
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Columns (3) and (4) in Table 2.2 report regressions on the decision to fine
the seller. From Column (3) we observe that the share of spectators increases
by 3.3 percentage points when the seller proposed the deal (p = 0.026)
and it increases by 8.0 percentage points when the seller has obfuscated
the information (p < 0.001). Table 2.4 shows that these results hold for all
subgroups. We furthermore observe that older spectators and Republican
spectators are significantly less likely to fine the seller (p = 0.002 and p =
0.015 respectively).
Result 4: Across treatments, only a minority decide to fine the seller. The share of
spectators who fine the seller is higher when the seller has been active in the process
leading up to the deal, by having proposed the transaction or having obfuscated the
information.
Since the share who canceled the deal is increasing with the involvement
of the seller, the share of spectators who fine the seller will be increasing
with the seller’s involvement even when the share who fine conditional on
canceling is the same across treatments. It could, however, also be the case
that those who have canceled the deal are more likely to fine if the seller has
been involved in obfuscating the information and proposing the deal. To
shed light on this mechanism, we examine the share of spectators who fine
the seller among those spectators who canceled the deal. Table 2.7 in the
appendix shows the same overall pattern of results for the share of spectators
who fine the seller conditional on having canceled the transaction. The share
of spectators who fine the seller among the spectators who canceled the
transaction increases from 19.5 percent in the Low treatment to 32.2 percent













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































fine is not only driven by the higher number of spectators who cancel the
transaction.
2.4.3 Beliefs and policy attitudes
Our study also provides evidence that people believe that the type of situ-
ation presented to the spectators, in which sellers exploit the irrationality
of consumers, is common. At the end of the experiment, the spectators
were asked about their beliefs about the behavior of consumers and firms,
as well as their policy attitudes. The results are reported in Figure 2.5. We
observe that a large majority of the participants agree with the statement
that consumers often make mistakes when evaluating a product or service
(78.0 percent strongly agree, or agree). A majority of spectators also agree
with the statement that companies often profit from consumers’ mistakes
(78.5 percent agree, or strongly agree) and with the statement that companies
actively target consumers who are likely to make mistakes (58.8 percent
agree, or strongly agree).
We also measured attitudes to government regulations by asking the par-
ticipants about the extent to which they agree with the statement that "The
government should restrict businesses’ opportunity to make profit from cus-
tomers who misunderstand the value of a product or service". More people
agree with the statement (42.6 percent strongly agree, or agree) than disagree
(30.2 percent strongly disagree, or disagree).
We find a strong correlation between people’s decision in the experiment
and their support for government regulation. Table 2.5 reports regressions
on whether the spectators either strongly agree or agree that the government
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Figure 2.5: Beliefs and policy attitudes
Note: The figure reports the share of spectators who strongly agree or agree to the
following statements: "People often have the wrong beliefs about how valuable a
product or service would be for them" (Mistakes), "Businesses often make profit
from customers who misunderstand the value of a product or service" (Profits),
"Businesses actively target customers who are likely to overestimate the value of
their product or service" (Targets), and "The government should restrict businesses’
opportunity to make profit from customers who misunderstand the value of a




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































should restrict businesses’ opportunity to make profit from customers who
misunderstand. From columns (1) and (2) we observe that those who cancel
the deal or fine the seller are much more likely to agree with the need for
government regulation (p < 0.001 and p < 0.001). From column (6) we
observe that this holds even when we control for beliefs and background
characteristics. We summarize these findings in the following result:
Result 5: Behavior in the experiment is strongly predictive of attitudes to govern-
ment regulation. Spectators who cancel the deal or fine the seller are more likely
to agree that the government should restrict businesses’ opportunity to profit from
irrational consumers.
2.5 Concluding remarks
We have presented the first set of evidence showing that a majority of Ameri-
cans prefer to cancel voluntary deals in which a consumer has misunderstood
the true value of a product and pays more for the product than it is worth.
This is the case even when the seller’s role is limited to accepting a proposal
made by the buyer. This suggests that the main concern people have with
deals in which a seller exploits the irrationality of a buyer are the conse-
quences which these deals produce.
The willingness to cancel deals in which consumers are exploited sheds light
on the widespread support for stricter government regulation of businesses,
such as the US CARD act (Agarwal et al., 2015) or European regulations
about "unfair" contract features (Heidhues et al., 2018). However, the fact
that a large minority choose to uphold such transactions even in settings
where the seller has actively contributed to the buyer’s confusion and then
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proposed the deal also sheds light on why such regulatory efforts often meet
fierce resistance.
Only a small minority of the spectators consider the seller’s involvement
to be critical for the decision to cancel or not. In contrast, the seller’s in-
volvement, particularly whether they have obfuscated the information the
buyer received, is important for the decision to fine. This suggests that
procedural concerns play a more important role in people’s willingness to
fine the seller than in their willingness to cancel the deal. Further, the find-
ing that procedural concerns are strongly driven by opposition to complex
information disclosure could offer insight into widespread acceptance of
policy initiatives that improve access to information from firms (Reisch and
Sunstein, 2016; Sunstein, 2019b). This result underlines the importance of
firms’ decisions about how to disclose information about their products and
it provides evidence that complex information can negatively influence con-
sumer perception of a firm (Bao and Ho, 2015; Kozup et al., 2008; Nguyen
and Mutum, 2012).
The present study also suggests that fairness considerations need to be taken
into account by firms when considering how to handle their customers.
In line with previous research (Bhattacharjee et al., 2017; Kahneman et al.,
1986), we find that people are willing to punish firms that earn a profit
from behavior that they perceive as unacceptable. We also show that simply
accepting to be paid more for a product than it is worth can be seen as
unacceptable.
In this study, we have examined people’s attitudes to deals where consumers
who make mistakes when calculating the value of a product are exploited.
An interesting question for future research is to examine people’s attitudes
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to the exploitation of other types of irrationality among consumers. Finally,
the present study is conducted with participants recruited from the general
population in the US. An important question for future research is how
attitudes in the US compare with attitudes in other countries.
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2.A Demographics
Table 2.6: Descriptive Statistics
Number of participants Share
Income < $30,000 1130 0.28
Income 30,001 - $60,000 1136 0.28
Income 60,001 - $100,000 925 0.23
Income 100,001 - $150,000 523 0.13
Income > $150,000 277 0.07
High School Education or below 1158 0.29
Some College Education 1342 0.34
Bachelor or equivalent 956 0.24
Master or equivalent 535 0.13
18 - 34 years old 1035 0.26
35 - 44 years old 740 0.19
45- 54 years old 812 0.20
55 - 64 years old 682 0.17


























β1 + β2 + β3 0.127∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025)




Note: The table reports results from an OLS-regression of the share of spectators
that fine the seller among spectators that canceled the deal. "Proposed" is an in-
dicator variable for the spectator being assigned to the treatment where the seller
proposed the transaction. "Obfuscated" is an indicator variable for the spectator
being assigned to the treatment in which the seller obfuscated the information.
"Proposed*Obfuscated" is the interaction between "Proposed" and "Obfuscated".
"Female" is an indicator variable for being female. "College" is an indicator variable
for the spectator having a bachelor degree or higher. "Age" is an indicator variable
for the spectator being older than 47 years. "Income" is an indicator variable for the
spectator having a household income of more than $60,000 per year. "Republican" is
an indicator variable for the spectator voting for the Republican party. β1 + β2 + β3
is the linear combination of the parameters for Proposed, Obfuscated and the inter-





On the next screen we ask you to make a decision that might have real
consequences for two other individuals. We recruited these two individuals
on an international online labor market to participate in a study. Both indi-
viduals received a participation fee.
We randomly assigned the two individuals to either the role of seller or
the role of buyer. The seller was given a product that he or she could sell to
the buyer.
We informed both the seller and the buyer that the product had no value for
the seller. The seller, but not the buyer, was informed that the value of the
product for the buyer was $2.
The seller could not disclose this information to the buyer. Instead, we gave
the buyer information about the value of the product in a complex manner.
The buyer made a mistake when interpreting this information and wrongly
believed that the value of the product for him or her was $20. The seller
knew that the buyer made this mistake.
The buyer offered to buy the product for $10 from the seller. The seller
accepted this offer.
- The seller gained $10 on the deal.
- The buyer lost $8 on the deal.
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We now want you to decide whether this deal should be upheld or not.
o I want to uphold the deal. The seller gains $10 and the buyer loses $8.
o I want to cancel the deal. Neither the seller nor the buyer gain or lose.
There is a one-in-five chance that your decision will be implemented. If
your decision is implemented, the seller and the buyer will receive payments
according to your decision within a few days. The seller and the buyer
are informed that a third-party will make a decision that determines their
payments.
Propose treatment
On the next screen we ask you to make a decision that might have real
consequences for two other individuals. We recruited these two individuals
on an international online labor market to participate in a study. Both indi-
viduals received a participation fee.
We randomly assigned the two individuals to either the role of seller or
the role of buyer. The seller was given a product that he or she could sell to
the buyer.
We informed both the seller and the buyer that the product had no value for
the seller. The seller, but not the buyer, was informed that the value of the
product for the buyer was $2.
The seller could not disclose this information to the buyer. Instead, we gave
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the buyer information about the value of the product in a complex manner.
The buyer made a mistake when interpreting this information and wrongly
believed that the value of the product for him or her was $20. The seller
knew that the buyer made this mistake.
The seller offered to sell the product to the buyer for $10. The buyer ac-
cepted this offer.
- The seller gained $10 on the deal.
- The buyer lost $8 on the deal.
We now want you to decide whether this deal should be upheld or not.
o I want to uphold the deal. The seller gains $10 and the buyer loses $8.
o I want to cancel the deal. Neither the seller nor the buyer gain or lose.
There is a one-in-five chance that your decision will be implemented. If
your decision is implemented, the seller and the buyer will receive payments
according to your decision within a few days. The seller and the buyer
are informed that a third-party will make a decision that determines their
payments.
Obfuscate Treatment
On the next screen we ask you to make a decision that might have real
consequences for two other individuals. We recruited these two individuals
on an international online labor market to participate in a study. Both indi-
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viduals received a participation fee.
We randomly assigned the two individuals to either the role of seller or
the role of buyer. The seller was given a product that he or she could sell to
the buyer.
We informed both the seller and the buyer that the product had no value for
the seller. The seller, but not the buyer, was informed that the value of the
product for the buyer was $2.
The seller had the opportunity to disclose information about the value of the
product to the buyer in an easy-to-understand manner, but decided not to
do so. Instead, the seller decided to disclose the information to the buyer in
a complex manner.
The buyer made a mistake when interpreting this information and wrongly
believed that the value of the product for him or her was $20. The seller
knew that the buyer made this mistake.
The buyer offered to buy the product for $10 from the seller. The seller
accepted this offer.
- The seller gained $10 on the deal.
- The buyer lost $8 on the deal.
We now want you to decide whether this deal should be upheld or not.
o I want to uphold the deal. The seller gains $10 and the buyer loses $8.
o I want to cancel the deal. Neither the seller nor the buyer gain or lose.
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There is a one-in-five chance that your decision will be implemented. If
your decision is implemented, the seller and the buyer will receive payments
according to your decision within a few days. The seller and the buyer
are informed that a third-party will make a decision that determines their
payments.
High Treatment
On the next screen we ask you to make a decision that might have real
consequences for two other individuals. We recruited these two individuals
on an international online labor market to participate in a study. Both indi-
viduals received a participation fee.
We randomly assigned the two individuals to either the role of seller or
the role of buyer. The seller was given a product that he or she could sell to
the buyer.
We informed both the seller and the buyer that the product had no value for
the seller. The seller, but not the buyer, was informed that the value of the
product for the buyer was $2.
The seller had the opportunity to disclose information about the value of the
product to the buyer in an easy-to-understand manner, but decided not to
do so. Instead, the seller decided to disclose the information to the buyer in
a complex manner.
The buyer made a mistake when interpreting this information and wrongly
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believed that the value of the product for him or her was $20. The seller
knew that the buyer made this mistake.
The seller offered to sell the product to the buyer for $10. The buyer ac-
cepted this offer.
- The seller gained $10 on the deal.
- The buyer lost $8 on the deal.
We now want you to decide whether this deal should be upheld or not.
o I want to uphold the deal. The seller gains $10 and the buyer loses $8.
o I want to cancel the deal. Neither the seller nor the buyer gain or lose.
There is a one-in-five chance that your decision will be implemented. If
your decision is implemented, the seller and the buyer will receive payments
according to your decision within a few days. The seller and the buyer




Partisan self-interest is an
important driver for people’s
support for the regulation of
targeted political advertising
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Abstract
The rapid emergence of targeted political advertising has sparked a heated
public debate over what the government’s response should be, and has led
to public pressure advocating stricter regulation. To date, the regulatory
debate has centered around public concerns about the collection and use of
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citizens’ private data. This paper tested and confirmed the hypothesis that
public attitudes toward stricter regulation of targeted political advertising
are also motivated by partisan self-interest. We conducted an experiment
using an online survey of 1549 Americans who identify as either Democrats or
Republicans. Our findings show that Democrats and Republicans believe that
targeted political advertising benefits the opposing party. This belief is based
on their conviction that their political opponents are more likely to mobilize
by targeted political advertising than are supporters of their own party. We
exogenously manipulated the beliefs of a random subset of participants by
truthfully informing them that, in the past, targeted political advertising has
benefited Republicans. This enabled us to establish a causal link between
beliefs about partisan advantage and attitudes toward stricter regulation. Our
findings show that Republicans informed about this benefit had less favorable
attitudes toward regulation than did their uninformed co-partisans. This
suggests that participants’ attitudes regarding stricter regulation are based not
solely on concerns about privacy violations, but also, in part, on beliefs about
whether regulation would benefit their party. This result implies that people
are willing to accept violations of their privacy if their preferred party benefits
from the use of targeted political advertising.
Keywords: Electoral competition | Targeted political advertising | Govern-
ment regulation | Third-person effect | Privacy concerns
3.1 Introduction
Recent advances in technology and the availability of vast amounts of per-
sonal data online have dramatically altered a key element of the electoral
process: political campaigning (Fowler et al., 2020). Political parties and
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campaigns can now microtarget specific messages to narrow groups of vot-
ers based on granular personal data (De Corniere and De Nijs, 2016) (see
Appendix for a discussion). Targeted political advertising as a new method
of political campaigning is quickly becoming a major tool for political actors
(Hager, 2019) and has been publicly implicated as a factor causing unantic-
ipated outcomes in a number of elections (Benkler et al., 2018). According
to public opinion polling, the large majority of Americans considers the use
of personal data for targeted online political ads unacceptable (Smith, 2018),
and a heated public debate calling for stricter regulations has accompanied
the emergence of such ads (Aral and Eckles, 2019; Dobber et al., 2019a; Kim
et al., 2018). In response to public pressure (Isaac, 2019), Twitter and Google
have already instituted self-imposed measures that either ban the use of
targeted political advertising outright or limit the technical abilities of cam-
paigns to use these platforms (Lerman, 2019; Wong, 2019). Facebook has
responded by establishing an archive that stores all political ads that have
been run on the platform (Leathern, 2020) and an option to opt-out from
seeing political advertisement for people in the United States (Isaac, 2020).
Despite the potentially far-reaching consequences posed by targeted online
political ads and the mounting public pressure to regulate them, the political
response has been slow. Consequently, targeted online political ads are still
largely unregulated (Beyersdorf, 2019; Dommett and Power, 2019; Weintraub,
2019). Both public calls for regulation and private sector directives address
primarily a lack of protection and transparency regarding the use of personal
data for targeted political ads (Burkell and Regan, 2019; Dobber et al., 2019b;
Dommett, 2019).
In fact, the recent debate over stricter regulation has focused on restrictions
on the use of personal data (Sihvola, 2019) (see Appendix for a discussion).
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Previous research has established that people value the privacy of their data
and that privacy concerns are an important factor in determining people’s
attitudes toward the regulation of targeted advertising in general (Acquisti
et al., 2016; Bellman et al., 2004; Milberg et al., 2000; Okazaki et al., 2009) (see
Appendix for a discussion). Unease about the use of private data appears
particularly pressing in the context of targeted political advertising, as such
advertising requires the collection, storage and use of large amounts of
sensitive data about people’s political attitudes (Baum et al., 2019; Rubinstein,
2014). Furthermore, people seem especially worried about the use of their
private data by political actors (Tan et al., 2018). Therefore, the public debate
about stricter regulation of targeted political advertising has focused largely
on the data security and privacy consequences of such data collection, as
well as on the lack of transparency in its use (Boerman et al., 2017; Burkell
and Regan, 2019; Dobber et al., 2019b; Dommett, 2019; Magalhães et al., 2018;
Wood and Ravel, 2017).
In this paper, we argue that attitudes toward the regulation of targeted on-
line political advertising are driven not only by concerns over the misuse of
private data. While targeted commercial advertising influences only individ-
uals’ purchasing choices, targeted political advertising has the potential to
influence voting decisions and, as a result, elections (Zuiderveen Borgesius et
al., 2018; Magalhães et al., 2018). This has consequences for broader societal
outcomes, affecting far more than individual data protection. We posit that
people take these consequences into account when forming preferences re-
garding the regulation of targeted political ads. Research on public opinions
about other aspects of the electoral process indicates that self-interest is an im-
portant factor in people’s positions about the electoral effects of regulations
(Alvarez et al., 2011; Biggers, 2019; Boix, 1999). Attitudes on gerrymander-
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ing, voter ID laws, or same-day voter registration all seem to be driven by
partisan self-interest, or by the concern for ensuring advantages for one’s
preferred party (Ansolabehere, 2009; Chen and Rodden, 2013; McCarthy,
2019). This study seeks to explore whether, in addition to privacy concerns,
partisan self-interest is an important determinant of people’s attitudes to-
wards stricter regulation of targeted political advertising. For that purpose,
we ran an experiment in the United States using an online survey. Working
with a sample of Republican and Democratic participants, we investigated
participants’ beliefs about the consequences of using targeted political adver-
tising aimed at voters of both parties in order to determine whether there is
a link between partisan self-interest and attitudes towards targeted political
advertising.
Understanding people’s beliefs about the effects of political advertising on
electoral outcomes is critical for ascertaining the underlying drivers of public
attitudes towards stricter regulation. Political parties use targeted political
ads mainly to mobilize their own voters. Therefore, people’s perceptions as
to whether targeted political advertising benefits or harms their party depend
on whether they believe that voters of their own party are mobilized more
strongly than are voters of the opposing party or vice versa. If people are
motivated by partisan self-interest, they would oppose regulation in the first
case, based on their perception that targeted political advertising would give
their party an advantage in mobilization. In the latter case, people would
demand regulation in order to mitigate the opposing party’s mobilization
advantage. We hypothesize that supporters of both parties believe targeted
political ads yield an advantage for the opposing party.
Due to the potential difficulty people may have in correctly estimating the
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actual effects of targeted political advertising on others, it is plausible that
they could hold biased or unfounded beliefs about the issue. As a result,
to assess the ads’ effects, Democrats must guess how Republicans react to
mobilizing messages and vice versa. However, campaign messages that
are delivered to targeted recipients remain largely unavailable to others
(Magalhães et al., 2018). Given the limited transparency of targeted political
advertising (Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., 2018; Wood and Ravel, 2017), as
well as the paucity of information about its effects on voters (Aral and Eckles,
2019), it seems likely that people do indeed have difficulties arriving at
accurate estimates (FeldmanHall and Shenhav, 2019).
Academic work on the extent to which a person will be influenced by tar-
geted online political ads, while still scarce, does suggest that demographics,
place of residence, and political ideology all play a role in determining this
phenomenon (Liberini et al., 2020). There is, however, a large body of re-
search on people’s beliefs about the effect of undesirable persuasive mass
communication on others, documenting that people generally believe that
others are influenced by it to a larger extent than they are themselves. This
phenomenon is known as the third-person effect (Davison, 1983; Perloff, 1993)
(See Appendix for a discussion). Past studies have shown that the strength
of the third-person effect increases with social distance to the "other" (Jang
and Kim, 2018; Perloff, 1999; White, 1997). Furthermore, the third-person
effect predicts that people not only believe that others are more influenced by
undesirable mass communication, but that these people also take action to
rectify the consequences of such persuasive messages (Xu and Gonzenbach,
2008). High levels of polarization and mistrust between Democrats and
Republicans in the United States suggest that the social distance between par-
tisans is large (Ahler and Sood, 2018; Bordalo et al., 2016; Finkel et al., 2020;
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Iyengar et al., 2019; Lees and Cikara, 2020; Martherus et al., 2019; Mason,
2018; Moore-Berg et al., 2020; Nyhan, 2020). Hence, the potential presence
of the third-person effect, combined with a large social distance between
the parties, suggests that both Republicans and Democrats may believe that
opposing partisans are influenced by targeted political advertising to a larger
extent than are supporters of their own party. Crucially, this means that
the opposing party is perceived as gaining more from the use of mobilizing
messages directed at their own electorate than is one’s own party. As a result,
according to the literature on the third-person effect, it can be inferred that
people who believe voters of the other party are more influenced by targeted
political ads than are voters of their own party will also support regulation
of this advertising.
We therefore further hypothesize that supporters of each party believe that
supporters of the opposing party are more strongly influenced by targeted
political advertising than they themselves are. As a consequence, they be-
lieve that the other party experiences an advantage from targeted online
political ads and, therefore, favor stricter regulation, perceiving it to be in
their partisan self-interest. To test these hypotheses in our experiment, we
measured participants’ beliefs about the effect of targeted political advertis-
ing on both co-partisans and supporters of the opposing party, as well as
their respective attitudes toward regulation. To establish the existence of a
causal link between partisan self-interest and attitudes toward regulation,
we exogenously manipulated participants’ beliefs about the effect of targeted
political advertising.
This study is composed of a correlational and an experimental part. The
correlational part provides evidence that participants believe that supporters
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of the opposing party are more influenced by targeted political advertising
than are supporters of their own party. Importantly, we also show that beliefs
about the effect of targeted political advertising on supporters of the other
party relative to supporters of one’s own party are positively correlated with
a stronger demand for regulation. As a consequence, support for stricter
regulation is linked not only to concerns about individuals’ privacy, but also
to participants’ beliefs about partisan self-interest. In the experimental part of
the study, we truthfully informed a randomly selected sample of participants
that the Republican party benefited more than the Democratic party from the
use of targeted political advertising in the 2016 presidential election. Thereby,
we changed Republicans’ perceptions of partisan self-interest without alter-
ing their concerns about privacy. Republican recipients of this information
were less supportive of regulation than were their co-partisans who had
not been given this information. This finding reveals a causal link between
beliefs about partisan self-interest and people’s attitudes toward stricter
regulation. Our results reveal the challenges posed by new technological
advances in the political domain and the ensuing need for new regulation.
We show that some partisans are willing to oppose regulation if they believe
that targeted political advertising benefits their preferred party, even at the
expense of concerns about privacy violations and massive data collection.
Our findings further reveal that attitudes toward regulation are partially
driven by biased beliefs about the effect of targeted political advertising on





We conducted a pre-registered, incentivized online survey experiment with
a sample of adult Americans identifying either as Democrats or Republicans.
The pre-registration is available at the AEA RCT Registry AEARCTR-0005296.
The study received an Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval from the
Norwegian School of Economics, and all participants gave informed consent
before taking part in the study. Part C of the appendix contains detailed
information about instructions and measurements. Figure 3.3 in the appendix
provides an overview of the structure of the experiment.
There were three phases to this study. In the first phase, we informed partici-
pants about targeted online political advertising and measured their beliefs
about its effect on supporters of both the Republican and Democratic par-
ties. In the second phase, the experimental manipulation was conducted
by informing a random subset of participants about the beneficial effects
of targeted political ads for Republicans. In the third phase, we measured
all participants’ attitudes toward the regulation of targeted political ads,
performed a manipulation check, and measured respondents’ demographics
along with a number of other control variables. The following describes each
phase in detail.
To ensure that all participants had the same knowledge on the subject, in the
first phase of the study, participants were asked to read a text about targeted
online political advertising that explained its technical aspects and its typical
usage. We then asked participants to consider a hypothetical scenario in
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which both Republicans and Democrats competed in a close electoral race in
which they spent equivalent sums on targeted online political advertising.
We elicited participants’ beliefs about the extent to which they thought that
they personally, Republicans and Democrats alike, would be influenced by
targeted political advertising, using a five-point Likert scale ranging from
"not at all" to "to a very great extent." This measurement corresponds to
previous findings from the literature on the third-person effect (Jang and
Kim, 2018; Perloff, 1999). The order of the questions about Republicans and
Democrats was randomized. To address concerns that participants could
potentially want to give negative answers about the opposing side while
not necessarily believing that such answers had a basis in fact (Bullock et
al., 2015; Gerber and Huber, 2010), we emulated the approach of previous
studies (Prior et al., 2015), and asked participants to commit to answering
the questions to the best of their knowledge.
In the second phase of the survey, participants were randomly placed in
either the treatment or the control group. Participants in the treatment group
were informed that controlling for the number of ads people saw, targeted
political advertising on Facebook significantly increased voter turnout for
the Republicans in the 2016 presidential election, while having no effect on
Democrats. With this wording, we ensured that participants did not look to
different levels of campaign spending as a possible cause of the ads’ effects.
The complete wording of the information used with the treatment group can
be found in the appendix part C. The results are based on a study by Liberini
et al. (Liberini et al., 2020).
In the final phase of the study, we measured all participants’ attitudes to-
wards regulation of targeted political online political advertising on a four-
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item, seven-point Likert scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly
agree"(adapted from (Krasnova et al., 2009)). The possible responses were:
(i) Targeted political advertising should be banned; (ii) I support legislation
that requires targeted online political advertising to be clearly marked as
targeted; (iii) More regulation is needed when it comes to targeted online
political advertising; and (iv) The government is already doing enough to
regulate targeted online political advertising (reverse coded). The order of
these responses was randomized. We incentivized honest answers by in-
forming participants that their responses would be sent to the United States
Congress in an aggregated and anonymous form (Elías et al., 2019), stressing
that there was no deception in the study.
To determine whether the information treatment succeeded in manipulating
beliefs about the effects of targeted political advertising of participants in
the treatment group, all subjects were then asked to make an estimation
of the number of interactions (likes, shares, comments) that social media
campaigns on Facebook of both Republicans and Democrats received rela-
tive to each other prior to the midterm elections in 2018. This enabled us
to ascertain whether participants generalized from information about the
2016 Presidential election and applied it to other elections. We offered a
monetary incentive for participants to answer the question to the best of their
knowledge (De Quidt et al., 2018). Participants giving the correct answer
received a bonus of $1 (Bullock et al., 2015; Flynn et al., 2017). The exact
wording of the question can be found in the appendix part C. In order to
control for the possibility that the intervention influenced only beliefs about
targeted political advertising’s persuasiveness, but not about other prob-
lematic aspects of such advertising, we also measured whether participants
thought the advertising was: (i) socially desirable; (ii) harmful to society
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(reverse coded); (iii) beneficial to cultural values; and (iv) unfavorable to
societal norms (reverse coded) on a ten-point scale.
To assess the level of privacy concerns, we presented participants with a
four-item, seven-point Likert scale questionnaire (adapted from (Krasnova
et al., 2009)) in which we asked participants whether they were concerned
that their data was: (i) collected and stored by third-parties; (ii) shared with
third-parties; (iii) used to display targeted advertising to them; and (iv) used
for commercial purposes. The order of the items was randomized. We further
included a fifth item as an attention check to ensure that participants carefully
read the items. In accordance with our pre-analysis plan, participants who
failed this attention check and another attention check were not included in
the final sample.
We further collected data for political attitudes in terms of political engage-
ment, subjective political knowledge, participants’ level of social and eco-
nomic conservatism (Everett, 2013), an ANES-based feelings thermometer
towards both the Republican and the Democratic parties (Iyengar et al., 2019),
and participants’ perceived political efficacy (Bowler and Donovan, 2002).
The demographic control variables included age, gender, ethnicity, education,
income, household size, use time on the internet, use of an ad-blocker and
social media usage.
3.2.2 Sample characteristics
We collected the data for this survey between the January 15, 2020 and Jan-
uary 24, 2020. We collaborated with the survey company Dynata to recruit
our participants. For that purpose, we used Dynata’s political panel to recruit
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Republicans and Democrats, as Dynata collaborates with L2, the largest vot-
ing tracking service in the United States. Therefore, we were able to recruit
Democrats and Republicans for whom party affiliation was partially verified
by their actual voting behavior. That further enabled us to avoid recruiting
Independents for our study. In total we recruited a demographically diverse
sample of 1549 American participants who were either Democrats or Repub-
licans. On average, participants were 47.49 years old. Of the sample, 50.55
percent were female and 25.05 percent were non-white. The participants were
better educated than the overall population of the United States. Appendix
Table 3.3 provides an overview of the characteristics of our sample. Among
the participants, 777 identified as Republicans and 772 as Democrats. Given
the nature of the experimental design, Independents were not included in
the study. We randomly assigned the participants to either the treatment
group (755 participants: 369 Democrats, 386 Republicans) or the control
group (794 participants: 403 Democrats, 391 Republicans). Treatment assign-
ment was balanced taking into consideration observable characteristics and
pre-treatment beliefs (Appendix Table 3.4).
3.3 Results
This section presents the results of the study. First, we will present evidence
supporting the hypothesis that supporters of both parties believe that sup-
porters of the opposing party are influenced to a larger extent by targeted
political advertising than are supporters of their own party. This implies that
they believe that the use of targeted political advertising undermines their
partisan self-interest. We will then present correlational results regarding
the link between these beliefs, privacy concerns and support for stricter
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regulation. Last, we will present our findings about the causal role of be-
liefs about the effects of targeted political advertising on attitudes towards
regulation. The analysis was performed using Stata SE 16.0. The data, full
instructions for participants, analysis code and variable coding are available
at 10.17605/OSF.IO/QM7DZ.
3.3.1 Beliefs about the differential effect of targeted politi-
cal advertising on opposing versus fellow partisans
Figure 3.1 shows the participants’ beliefs about the extent to which targeted
political advertising influences Republicans and Democrats. We found that
Republicans believed that Democrats (µ = 3.20, SD = 1.18) are more influ-
enced than are Republicans (µ = 2.83, SD = 1.10, Wilcoxon-signed-rank-test,
z = −8.67, p < 0.001, r = 0.41). In contrast, Democrats stated that they be-
lieved that Republicans (µ = 3.41, SD = 1.17) were more influenced than were
Democrats (µ = 2.94, SD = 1.02, Wilcoxon-signed-rank-test, z = −11.336, p <
0.001, r = 0.31). Consistent with the third-person effect, these results show
that Republicans as well as Democrats expressed the belief that supporters of
the opposing party are more influenced by targeted political advertisement
than are supporters of their own party. Exploratory data analysis reveals
that the difference in participants’ beliefs about the effect of targeted political
advertisement on opposing party supporters relative to supporters of their
own party is not significantly different between Republicans and Democrats
(two-sided Welch t-test, t(1540), d = 0.08, p = 0.11). The belief gap between
own and other party indicates that supporters of both parties believe that the
opposing party benefits more from the use of targeted political advertising
than does their own, and therefore they perceive such advertising as harmful
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to their partisan self-interest. In line with the overall low perceived desir-
ability of these advertisements (µ = 4.66, SD = 2.01, measured on a ten-point
scale), we found that participants believed that targeted political advertising
had a small influence on themselves (µ = 2.39, SD = 1.21).
Figure 3.1: Beliefs about the effect of targeted political advertising
Note: The figure shows the beliefs of participants about the effect of targeted political
advertising on Democrats and Republicans. Beliefs are measured on a five-point Likert scale
(1 = "not at all", 5 = "to a very great extent"). The bars show 95% confidence intervals. *
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
The size of the belief gap between one’s own party and the other party is
correlated to different attitudes that participants hold. We found a significant
positive correlation between this gap and higher levels of affective and
ideological polarization, perceived desirability of the advertising, and high
subjective political knowledge. Participants holding a more negative view of
the opposing party as measured on a feelings thermometer reported their
belief in a larger difference in effects on supporters of the opposing parties
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and supporters of their own party (Appendix Table 3.5, OLS-Regression, p
< 0.001). We also found that the level of conservatism for Republicans and
liberalism for Democrats as measured on a scale for social and economic
conservatism (Everett, 2013) positively correlated with their beliefs about
how strongly opposing party supporters are influenced by targeted political
advertising (Appendix Table 3.5, OLS-Regression, p < 0.001). Participants
who saw the advertising as more socially and culturally desirable reported a
significantly smaller gap in beliefs between their own party and the other
party (Appendix Table 3.5, OLS-Regression, p < 0.001). Taken together, these
results suggest that people’s belief that supporters of the opposing party are
more influenced than supporters of their own party by political advertising is
linked to a negative perception of the opposition and a more general dislike
of targeted political advertising. This conclusion accords with previous
literature on the third-person effect that suggests that people’s belief about
the influence of media messages on others relative to themselves correlates
with the social distance to the other and a negative perception of the message.
Moreover, participants who self-reported a high level of political knowledge
reported a larger gap between their own party and the other party (Appendix
Table 3.5, OLS-Regression, p = 0.04).
3.3.2 Support for government regulation
On average, we found that participants were in favor of regulation (µ = 4.82,
SD = 1.18 , Cronbach’s-α = 0.67). Figure 3.4 in the Appendix shows the
distribution of support for regulation. Overall, 70 percent of participants
supported stricter regulation of targeted political advertisement. Support
for stricter government regulation was higher in the baseline condition (two-
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sided Welch t-test, t(782), Cohen’s-d = 0.41, p < 0.001) among participants
who identified as Democrats (µ = 5.06, SD = 1.10) compared to Republicans
(µ = 4.59, SD = 1.21). We further found that, on average, participants
were concerned about the use of their private data in targeted political
advertising (µ = 5.63, SD = 1.25, Cronbach’s-α = 0.90). This concern was
not significantly different (two sided Welch t-test, t(1529) = 0.10, Cohen’s-d
= 0.05, p = 0.31) between Democrats (µ = 5.67, SD = 1.26) and Republicans
(µ = 5.60, SD = 1.25). Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of privacy concerns
among participants. This concern was not significantly different (two sided
Welch t-test, t(1529), Cohen’s-d = 0.05, p = 0.31) between Democrats (µ = 5.67,
SD = 1.26) and Republicans (µ = 5.60, SD = 1.25).
We ran an OLS-regression to test whether privacy concerns and beliefs about
partisan self-interest were significantly correlated to participants’ support
for regulation. Partisan self-interest is measured as the difference between
participants’ beliefs about the effect targeted political advertising has on
supporters of the other party and on supporters of their own party. Table 3.1
shows that support for stricter government rules is significantly linked to
participants’ belief about partisan self-interest (Belief other party - own party,
p < 0.001). Column 1 shows that a 1 SD increase in the difference between
the other party and one’s own party is linked to a 0.12 SD increase in the
support for government regulation. This parameter is virtually unaffected
by the inclusion of control variables (Column 2). We further show that a 1
SD increase in privacy concerns of participants leads to a 0.28 SD increase
in support for regulation (Column 1, p < 0.001). Column 2 shows that the
inclusion of control variables does not significantly affect this parameter
either. We find no significant link between participants’ beliefs about the
effect that targeted political advertising has on themselves and their support
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for stricter regulation (Belief about effect on self, p = 0.19).
Table 3.1: Regression of determinants for the willingness to support stricter regulation of
targeted advertising
Support for regulation Support for regulation
Belief other party-own party 0.119∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.035)
Belief about self X 0.052
(0.039)





Social Media use No Yes
Political Engagement No Yes
Note: Regressions only include participants that answered all questions of the survey. The
table reports results from an OLS-regression in which people’s support for regulation is
the dependent variable. The value is standardized. Belief other party-own party is defined
as the difference between people’s belief about the effect on the other party and the effect
on the own party. Belief about self is people’s belief about the effect that targeted political
advertising has on them. Privacy concerns are respondents’ are measured on a seven-
point 4 item-Likert scale. All three independent variables are standardized. Demographic
information included age, education (dummy for above median in the sample), income
(dummy for above median in the sample), household size (dummy for more than two
members), gender (male dummy variable) and a dummy for being non-white. Social media
use was a dummy variable for the use of social media, a continuous variable for the time
people spent online in general (in hours), and the use of an ad-blocker (dummy for yes).
Political engagement was a dummy variable for being politically active within the last year,
external political efficacy, political knowledge (dummy for above median knowledge), and
attitudes towards government regulation in general. Table 3.11 in the appendix provides an
overview of all variables in the regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
To assess the robustness of our findings, we also ran an OLS-regression using
participants’ beliefs about the effect of targeted political advertising on the
opposing party and their beliefs about the effect on their own party as inde-
pendent variable. Table 3.6 in the Appendix shows that support for stricter
government regulation is strongly positively correlated to participants’ be-
liefs about the effect on the other party (p < 0.001) and negatively correlated
to the effect on own party, but this effect is not significant (p = 0.26).
135
3.3.3 The causal effect of beliefs about voters’ susceptibility
to targeted political advertisement and support for its
regulation
In the treatment condition, we informed a randomly selected subgroup of
Republicans and Democrats that Republicans benefited more from the use
of targeted political advertising in the 2016 presidential election than did
Democrats. Figure 3.2 shows the effect that this information had on beliefs
about social media interactions in the 2018 midterm election. We found that
in this incentivized question, Republicans and Democrats who had not re-
ceived that information reported beliefs that were qualitatively similar to the
first measure of beliefs. Uninformed Republicans believed that Democrats
received more interactions in the run-up to the 2018 midterm elections while
uninformed Democrats believed that Republicans received more interactions.
Responses to this question and to the more general question about the effects
of targeted political advertising on Republicans and Democrats are well
correlated (r = 0.24). Figure 3.6 in the appendix illustrates the relationship
between the answers to the general belief question that was reported on in
section 3.3.1 and this one asking about the 2018 midterm elections.
There is no difference in beliefs about the 2018 midterm elections between
Democrats who received the information about the 2016 Presidential election
and those who did not (χ2-test, p = 0.65). This result is in accordance with the
finding that Democrats already believed Republicans are more influenced
by political online advertising than members of their own party and that the
information they received was not new for them. Republicans who received
that information reported that they believed that Republicans received more
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interactions in 2018. This result represents a significant divergence in beliefs
between informed and uninformed Republicans that corresponds to the
information that they received (χ2-test, p = 0.04). Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8 in
the appendix show the distribution of answers for this question.
Figure 3.2: Beliefs about social media engagement in the 2018 midterm elections
Note: The figure shows participants’ beliefs about the ratio of interactions in the run-up
to the 2018 Midterm election. This was measured on a scale that ran from "Democrats
three times more than Republicans" to "Republicans three times more than Democrats" with
"Equal" as the mid-point.
We next determined whether the information shared with participants shifted
their support for stricter regulation of targeted political advertising. In ac-
cordance with the finding that beliefs of Democrats were not significantly
influenced by the information, we found no effect on support for regulation
between the treatment and the control group (two-sided Welch t-test, t(759),
Cohen’s d = 0.04, p = 0.58). Figure 3.9 in the appendix shows the distri-
butions of answers for Democrats in the treatment and the control groups.
With Republicans, we found significantly lower support for stricter regula-
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tion of targeted political advertising between the treatment and the control
groups (two-sided Welch t-test, t(776), Cohen’s d = 0.15, p = 0.04). These
effects remained qualitatively the same when examining only participants
who wanted their opinions to be considered by Congress (98.7 percent of
the sample) and participants who expressed trust in the information that
they had received about the effect of targeted political advertisement (85.7
percent of the treatment group), although in the latter case, the effect became
insignificant for Republicans (Appendix Table 3.7 and 3.8). Table 3.2 shows
the magnitude of the shift for Republicans in a reduced form regression.
Figure 3.10 shows the distribution of support for regulation for Republicans
in the treatment and the control groups.
We found a downward shift in Republicans’ support for regulation by 0.20 SD.
That effect is approximately equivalent to a 1.68 SD increase in participants’
belief regarding the extent to which Democrats are influenced by targeted
political advertising relative to Republicans and a 0.71 SD downward shift
in privacy concerns. This results in an approximately 50 percent increase in
support for regulation between Republicans and Democrats in the treatment
group compared to the control group (∆control = 0.47, ∆treatment = 0.70).
To preclude the possibility that the information about the effect of targeted
political advertising changed participants’ perception of how desirable such
advertising is or participants’ privacy concerns, we tested for significant
differences in these measures. We found that, in general, participants viewed
the use of targeted political advertising as undesirable (µ = 4.66, SD = 2.01).
Comparing the ratings of the desirability of targeted political advertising for
Republicans in the treatment (µ = 4.75, SD = 2.00) and the control groups
(µ = 4.85, SD = 2.00), we found no statistically significant difference (two-
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Table 3.2: Regression of Determinants for the willingness to regulate targeted ads












Social Media use No Yes
Political engagement No Yes
Note: Regressions only include participants that answered all questions of the survey. The
table reports the results of an OLS-regression with the support for regulation as a dependent
variable. The variable was standardized. Treatment is a dummy variable that is 1 when the
participant was assigned to the treatment condition and 0 otherwise. Republican is a dummy
variable that is 1 when the participant is a Republican and 0 if he or she is a Democrat.
Treatment*Republican is the interaction of these two variables. Privacy concerns is a measure
of people’s privacy concerns. The value is standardized. Demographic information included
age, education (dummy for above median in the sample), income (dummy for above median
in the sample), household size (dummy for more than two members), gender (male dummy
variable) and a dummy for being non-white. Social media use was a dummy variable for
the use of social media, a continuous variable for the time people spent online in general (in
hours), and the use of an ad-blocker (dummy for yes). Political engagement was a dummy
variable for being politically active within the last year, external political efficacy, political
knowledge (dummy for above median knowledge), and attitudes towards government
regulation in general. Table 3.12 in the appendix provides an overview of all variables in the
regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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sided Welch t-test, t(769), Cohen’s d = 0.05, p = 0.49). The same result was
found with Democrats in the treatment (µ = 4.42, SD = 2.03) and the control
groups (µ = 4.61,SD = 2.00 two-sided Welch t-test, t(755), Cohen’s d = 0.09, p
= 0.20). We also found no significant differences in privacy concerns between
the treatment and the control groups (two-sided Welch t-test, t(1526), d =
0.06, p = 0.32), for both Democrats (two-sided Welch t-test, t(759), Cohen’s d
= 0.05, p = 0.46) and Republicans (two-sided Welch t-test, t(768), Cohen’s d =
0.05, p = 0.49).
Exploratory data analysis reveals that the effect of the information on Repub-
licans was heterogeneous between different levels of conservatism. Figures
3.11 and 3.12 in the appendix illustrate the findings. We found that for those
Republicans scoring below the median in social and economic conservatism,
the information that their party benefited from the use of targeted political
advertisement did not significantly change their support for regulation com-
pared to the same group who did not receive this information (two-sided
Welch t-test, t(403), Cohen’s d = 0.02, p = 0.87). The support for stricter regu-
lation of targeted political advertisement among Republicans scoring at or
above the median in economic and social conservatism differed significantly
between the treatment and the control groups (two-sided Welch t-test, t(373),
Cohen’s d = 0.27, p = 0.01). This effect can not be attributed to initial differ-
ences in the support for regulation in the baseline condition between above
median and below median conservative Republicans (two-sided Welch t-test,
t(347), p = 0.64).
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3.4 Discussion
Our results provide evidence that the support for stricter regulation of tar-
geted online political advertising is partially motivated by partisan self-
interest. We show that both Republican and Democratic participants in our
sample believed that supporters of the opposing party are influenced by
targeted political advertising to a greater extent than are supporters of their
own party. We found that both this belief and people’s concern over privacy
significantly drive people’s support for policies limiting the use of such ads.
Republicans who were informed about the beneficial effects of targeted on-
line political ads for their party reported lower support for regulation than
did Republicans in the control group. Therefore, we are able to show that
the perception bias is causally linked to Republicans’ support for stricter
government regulation. This suggests that participants make a trade-off in
favor of partisan self-interest and contrary to concerns about the violation
of data privacy. We found that this effect is not present with all Republi-
can participants, but is concentrated among those with the highest levels of
conservatism. This finding concords with the idea that people trade-off per-
sonal costs, such as privacy concerns, against partisan self-interest. As more
conservative Republicans gain more strongly from an electoral advantage
for their party, they are more willing to accept violations of privacy if these
violations provide their preferred party with a benefit in an election.
These results contribute to the findings of previous research examining moti-
vations behind attitudes toward election laws. Previous work has shown that
political party leaders are willing to use government regulation in ways that
will increase the likelihood that they will get elected in the future (Alvarez
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et al., 2011; Boix, 1999; Bol et al., 2019; Matakos and Xefteris, 2015). This
behavior has been reported in the context of gerrymandering, voter ID laws
or same-day registration laws for voting (Ansolabehere, 2009; Biggers and
Hanmer, 2017; Chen and Rodden, 2013; McCarthy, 2019). To date, less is
known about the way the public, as opposed to the political elite, forms their
attitudes about electoral legislation (Biggers, 2019). While many scholars
suspect that the public’s strategic motivations resemble those of party elites,
there is only scarce causal evidence to support this hypothesis (Alvarez et al.,
2011; Stewart et al., 2016). For example, in the related domain of behavioral
policy interventions, experimental evidence suggests that US adults hold
more favorable opinions about policy interventions that are in line with their
political beliefs (Tannenbaum et al., 2017). However, most studies cannot
distinguish between when the public is pursuing strategic goals and when
the public is simply following party leaders‘ cues (Biggers, 2019). Our find-
ings support the idea that the broader public indeed pursues goals similar to
those of party elites, favors regulation based on their partisan self-interest,
and supports laws that contribute to the electoral success of their preferred
party.
Our findings further add to an emerging body of literature that shows that
some people are willing to make trade-offs between established democratic
norms and partisan self-interest (Graham and Svolik, 2019; Kunst et al., 2019;
Nyhan et al., 2020; Svolik, 2018, 2019). According to our results, participants
holding the strongest policy views have the greatest reaction to the infor-
mation that targeted political advertising benefits their party. This finding
accords with previous findings that people are willing to accept the under-
mining of democratic principles if it benefits their policy goals. In our case,
people’s attitudes towards the regulation of targeted political advertising
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are partially driven by the desire to set rules that benefit people’s preferred
party, even if they view targeted political advertising as harmful to societal
norms. This behavior might be perceived as a threat to perceptions of the
fairness of elections, which could then undermine peoples’ support for a
electoral system that relies on a shared understanding of democratic norms
(Birch, 2010; Doherty and Wolak, 2012; Douglas, 2013; Levitsky and Ziblatt,
2018; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Welzel and Inglehart, 2007). We show that
the rise of new technologies could potentially contribute to perceptions of
"democratic backsliding" (Svolik, 2018), as people might be willing to use the
newly-required rules for new technologies to pursue partisan self-interest.
We further show that beliefs about the impact that new technologies have
on the electoral process are crucial to our understanding of public attitudes
towards them. This finding contributes to a wider body of literature that
investigates how potentially erroneous beliefs that people hold drive their be-
havior (Coibion et al., 2020; Esberg et al., 2020; Goldfayn-Frank and Wohlfart,
2019; Haaland et al., 2020; Lergetporer et al., 2018; Malmendier and Nagel,
2016; Roth and Wohlfart, 2019).
This study reveals that it is difficult to understand public preferences for
certain policy measures without understanding the beliefs that people hold
about key variables that are affected by these policies. Preferences for regu-
lation of targeted political advertising are currently driven in part by third-
person perceptions, leading to biased beliefs about their effect. This situation
could lead to potentially sub-optimal policy decisions, as politicians might
follow public preferences that are driven by biased beliefs. Our findings
underscore the necessity of providing the public with truthful information
about the effect of targeted political advertising. We show that support for
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stricter regulation among Republicans would be significantly lower if they
were correctly informed about the effect that it had on the 2016 Presidential
election, because they underestimate the positive effect that targeted political
advertising might have had or will have on their own party.
Previous research on the third-person effect found evidence for a gap be-
tween the perceived effect of persuasive mass communication on the self
and on others (Davison, 1983; Perloff, 1993). Furthermore, correlational re-
search supports the hypothesis that this gap motivates people in performing
mitigating actions against the negative consequences of such persuasive com-
munication (Xu and Gonzenbach, 2008). Our study adds to this literature in
three ways. First, this study is the first to show that a perceptual gap exists
in the context of targeted online political advertising. Second, this study is
the first to establish a causal link between the perceptual gap described by
the third-person effect and a behavioral measure for support for government
regulation. By manipulating the perception gap of Republicans in our in-
formation treatment downward, and by showing that this decreases their
support of the mitigating action, we were able to show causality between
perception and behavior. Third, our results also add to previous studies
reporting that the third-person perception increases with social distance, or
between in-groups and out-groups (Jang and Kim, 2018; Perloff, 1999; White,
1997). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to show that the
perceived gap between Democrats and Republicans in their perceptions of
the influence of undesirable mass communication is strongly linked to affec-
tive as well as ideological polarization, and it is the first study to measure
this outcome with an unincentivized and an incentivized measure.
Our results have some limitations. First, we were unable to show similar
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causal results for Democratic supporters. We found a strong correlation be-
tween the beliefs that Democrats report about the effect that targeted political
advertising has on Republicans and their support for stricter government
regulation, but cannot claim causality for this group. Given that we needed
to truthfully inform participants that we were not using deception in this
study, we were unable to manipulate Democrats’ beliefs in a way that was
equivalent to that used with Republicans. Second, the main measure of
interest, participants’ support for stricter government regulation, indicates
relatively low-scale reliability (Cronbach’s α = 0.67). In the Appendix Tables
3.9 and 3.10, we report exploratory results that show that a reduced scale
(excl. the fourth item) has higher reliability (Cronbach’s α = 0.75) and that
all of our main results are robust to the reduced scale.
This paper develops a new experimental paradigm to study people’s atti-
tudes towards technological change which has an influence on elections. We
show that support for or opposition to the regulation of new technology that
has implications for the political process is driven by potentially biased be-
liefs about how the use of this technology affects political outcomes for one’s
preferred party. Therefore, our findings add to a growing policy debate and
underscore the necessity of making the effects of targeted political advertis-
ing transparent and of truthfully informing the public about the effects of the
new technology so that the public can fully and knowledgeably realize their
true attitudes. We believe that more research is necessary to fully understand
the public’s attitude towards these innovations, especially regarding beliefs
about the spread and effect of false information and divisive messages. Fur-
ther, our result indicating that people take into account the broader societal
effects of targeted advertising might have implications for certain aspects of
targeted commercial advertising. We would encourage future research to
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investigate whether similar mechanisms would motivate people to oppose,
for example, the use of targeted advertising to promote socially undesirable
consumption, such as smoking, drinking or other unhealthy behavior.
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3.A Overview
The appendix provides additional background information (part A), names
and explains deviations from the pre-analysis plan (part B), provides an
overview of the experimental design and instructions (part C) and presents
additional results (part D).
3.B Additional text
3.B.1 Targeted political online advertising
Targeted online advertising refers to a kind of advertising where people’s
data is used to direct advertising content to them that maximizes the like-
lihood of them reacting to it (Chen and Stallaert, 2014). Thus, targeted
advertisement is shown to people who most likely already have a preference
for its content, which increases ad spending efficiency (Iyer et al., 2005). In
case of political targeting, this means that parties show ads to voters who
they are most likely to mobilize. Furthermore, political actors can customize
their messages to the distinctive interests and concerns of these people, ad-
dressing issues that matter to them and employing language and form that
appeals to them (Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., 2018). Data used for targeting
can be demographic, or contain information about attitudes, interests, or
personality traits, which individuals either revealed online or that can be
deduced from their data (Boerman et al., 2017). This practice of tailoring
advertisement based on personality variables is called "psychographic pro-
filing" and often makes use of research on decision making to influence the
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recipient’s attitudes (Burkell and Regan, 2019).
While collecting voter data for advertising purposes is not new, the vast
amount of personal data used for targeting and tailoring political ads is un-
precedented and online behavioral data plays a major role in this (Rubinstein,
2014). With people generating more and more trackable information while
surfing online, this data has gained significant importance for advertisers
(Boerman et al., 2017). Online behavioral data can include search and pur-
chase histories, websites visited, articles read or videos watched and what
people communicate in e-mails and on social media (Boerman et al., 2017;
Jansen et al., 2013). This data is gathered and then resold by so called "com-
mercial data brokers", or companies whose business is "collecting personal
information about consumers from a variety of sources and aggregating,
analyzing, and sharing that information, or information derived from it, for
purposes such as marketing" (FTC, 2014). These firms track online behavioral
data by using tracking cookies, small text files that are stored on the user’s
computer after visiting a website. Tracking cookies that are placed on a
website by another entity are also called third-party cookies, while cookies
that originate from a website itself are called first-party cookies (Rubinstein,
2014). Third-party cookies can track users over several websites, with the
data usually being used for advertising (Boerman et al., 2017). An individual
website can have up to 350 built in cookies and the 100 most popular web-
sites have more than 6000 cookies combined, more than 80 percent of them
being third-party cookies (Altaweel et al., 2015). Tracking cookies can trace
users’ browsing history (including text entered or buttons clicked) and set-up
long-term records of their online behavior (Altaweel et al., 2015). These per-
sonal user histories are then sold by the commercial data brokers to political
strategists and are then combined with offline data from voter registration
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databases, response data from door-to-door canvassing, telephone surveys
or online behavioral data collected via candidates’ websites. Subsequently,
they are merged into detailed voter profiles (Rubinstein, 2014). Campaigners
can then apply predictive modeling techniques to the data to make inferences
on which users are most likely to vote for a party, and how to best address
them (Burkell and Regan, 2019).
3.B.2 The role of privacy concerns in the regulation of tar-
geted political advertising
A large body of literature has shown that individual privacy concerns are an
important determinant for people’s attitudes towards targeted advertising
(Baek and Morimoto, 2012; Evans, 2009; Krasnova et al., 2009; Okazaki et
al., 2009; Wang et al., 1998). The results of these studies also reveal that
individual privacy attitudes are closely linked to individual preferences to-
wards stricter privacy regulation (Milberg et al., 2000, 1995; Smith et al., 1996).
This literature has identified several reasons for this connection. People’s
individual risk preferences can play a role in determining their stance on
stricter regulation. If people perceive that the collection of their data can
create large risks to them, for example due to data breaches, they are more
likely to support stricter government regulation (Miltgen and Smith, 2015;
Okazaki et al., 2009). Further, trust towards internet companies and the firms
collecting data is an important factor in determining people’s attitudes to-
wards regulation (Edelman, 2011; Tang et al., 2008). If people have high levels
of trust towards these companies they are less likely to support sweeping
government regulation and believe that industry self-regulation is sufficient
(Xu et al., 2011). Additionally, people might see their private data as valuable
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commodity and demand stricter protection of their property right (Miltgen
and Smith, 2015). They therefore demand stricter government laws to ensure
that their property right is upheld (Acquisti et al., 2016; Jentzsch, 2003). Addi-
tionally, users might perceive targeted advertising as "creepy" when it relies
on their private data too heavily (Moore et al., 2015; Tene and Polonetsky,
2013). Taken together, these different motives lead to a heightened sense of
concern among people and can therefore motivate them to support stricter
government regulation.
3.B.3 The third-person effect in communication
The third-person effect is broadly defined as people’s perception that other
people are influenced by undesirable mass communication to a larger extent
than themselves (Davison, 1983). The emergence of the third-person effect
is linked to a more general perception that people see biases and mistakes
more strongly in others than in themselves (Pronin et al., 2002; Scopelliti
et al., 2015). Previous research also suggests that people in general have
too optimistic views of their own future outcomes and overestimate their
abilities (Sharot, 2011).
Undesirableness of media content is defined as having either socially unac-
ceptable content or intent (Gunther and Mundy, 1993) and the third-person
effect is most likely to emerge when the topic of the media content is of
personal importance and is perceived to be negatively biased against peo-
ple’s own interest (Perloff, 1993). Whether media content is perceived as
undesirable can be dependent on societal factors and might be influenced by
cultural traditions (Paul et al., 2000). Previous research has focused on media
content that describes societal taboo topics like pornography (Lo and Wei,
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2002), gambling (Youn et al., 2000), violence (McLeod et al., 1997), unhealthy
behaviors (Henriksen and Flora, 1999) or, more recently, fake news (Jang and
Kim, 2018) and has reliably found a third-person effect in that circumstances.
The strength of the third-person effect also depends on the social distance to
the "other" (Eveland et al., 1999). The more dissimilar, the more people think
that that person will be influenced by undesirable media messages. Other
work has focused on socially desirable topics (like ones promoting healthy
behavior (Henriksen and Flora, 1999) or disaster preparedness (Atwood,
1994)) and have found the opposite effect, a first-person effect. A first-person
effect is the perception that people themselves are more influenced by this
sort of media content as compared to others. This is in line with people’s
belief that they themselves are more likely to make wise decisions and in
general have higher abilities.
Previous research has further identified a second part of the third-person
effect: The behavioral part. This is a direct consequence of people’s per-
ception of the media’s effect on others. They adopt behaviors to rectify the
consequences of undesirable media messages on others (Sun et al., 2008).
The perception that others are strongly influenced by media messages can
trigger different responses, for example adaptive behavior (Sun et al., 2008).
This study focuses on behavior that is intended to rectify the consequences of
undesirable media communication. This behavior involves the support for
censorship of undesirable media content to shield more vulnerable groups
from its influence (Rojas et al., 1996). Alternatively, it can also be driven by
the intention to prevent negative influences for society, for example in the
case of the promotion of unhealthy behavior (Shah et al., 1999). Rectifying
behavior can also, in certain cases, lead to behavior that limits access of vul-
nerable groups to media (Hoffner and Buchanan, 2002) or increase support
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for media literacy training (Jang and Kim, 2018).
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3.C Deviations from the pre-analysis plan
The pre-analysis plan is available here: AEARCTR-0005296.
Data, full instructions, variable coding and analysis code are available at a
public OSF-repository. We deviated from the pre-plan in minor ways. We
excluded 41 responses on the survey because they were submitted from
people that entered the survey multiple times. Because we did not expect the
technical possibility that people can enter the survey several times, we did
not consider that in our pre-analysis plan. None of our results is sensitive
to the exclusion of these participants. We further had to exclude incomplete
responses from some regressions. Our regression results show that the inclu-
sion of control variables does not significantly affect our main parameters.
We further did not pre-register the regression we ran in table 3.1 of the
main paper. This test does not deviate from the pre-registered analysis or
hypothesis. Our main argument is built on the Welch t-test that is reported
in the same section and that shows the same result as the regression. The
regression we report in table 3.1 is pre-registered as secondary data analysis.
The primary outcome is reported in the appendix in table 3.6. Both results
are in line with the hypothesis that we pre-registered.
We further did not pre-register the comparison between privacy concerns in
treatment and control condition explicitly. We pre-registered more generally
that we will compare attitudes between treatment and control condition.
We further pre-registered some tests as one-sided tests. We decided to report
two-sided results for all tests for ease of interpretation of the reader. Analyses
that were not pre-registered are reported as exploratory data-analysis in the
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main body of the paper.
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3.D Instructions
Figure 3.3: Overview of the experimental design
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Information about targeted political advertising
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Question about the belief on the effect of targeted political advertising - Intro Screen
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Measure for support for regulation
161
For participants in treatment: Confidence in Research findings
162
Question if Congress should take answers into account
163
Manipulation check for change in beliefs
164
Measurement of privacy concerns
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3.E Additional figures and results
Figure 3.4: Density plot of participants’ support for stricter regulation of targeted political
advertising, measured on four item, seven-point Likert Scale
Note: Support for regulation was measured on a four item, seven-point Likert Scale. The
plot shows the distribution of support for regulation for all participants
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Figure 3.5: Density plot of participants’ privacy concerns
Note: Privacy concerns were measured on a four item, seven-point Likert Scale. The plot
shows the distribution of privacy concerns for all participants
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Figure 3.6: Relationship prior beliefs and manipulation check beliefs for participants in the
control group
Note: The size of the circles indicate frequency of combinations. If the circle is bigger that
indicates a higher frequency of both answers applying. The line shows a linear regression
between the two measures.
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Figure 3.7: Manipulation Check - Democrats
Note: The figure shows the responses of Democrats to the manipulation check for change in
beliefs. The grey bars indicate responses for participants in the control condition. The blue
bars indicate responses in the treatment condition.
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Figure 3.8: Manipulation Check Republicans
Note: The figure shows the responses of Republicans to the manipulation check for change
in beliefs. The grey bars indicate responses for participants in the control condition. The red
bars indicate responses in the treatment condition.
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Figure 3.9: Treatment effect - Democrat
Note: The figure displays support for stricter government regulation among Democrats.
Support for regulation was measured on a four item, seven-point Likert Scale. The blue area
indicates the distribution for Democrats in the treatment condition. The grey area displays
the distribution for Democrats in the control condition.
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Figure 3.10: Treatment effect - Republicans
Note: The figure displays support for stricter government regulation among Republicans.
Support for regulation was measured on a four item, seven-point Likert Scale. The red area
indicates the distribution for Republicans in the treatment condition. The grey area displays
the distribution for Republicans in the control condition.
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Figure 3.11: Treatment effect - Republicans below median conservative
Note: The figure displays support for stricter government regulation among moderate
Republicans. Support for regulation was measured on a four item, seven-point Likert Scale.
Political ideology was measured on a scale for economic and social conservatism. Moderate
Republicans were defined as being below median in this measure. The red area indicates the
distribution for moderate Republicans in the treatment condition. The grey area displays
the distribution for moderate Republicans in the control condition.
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Figure 3.12: Treatment effect - Republicans at or above median conservative
Note: The figure displays support for stricter government regulation among moderate
Republicans. Support for regulation was measured on a four item, seven-point Likert
Scale. Political ideology was measured on a scale for economic and social conservatism.
Conservative Republicans were defined as being at or above median in this measure. The
red area indicates the distribution for conservative Republicans in the treatment condition.
The grey area displays the distribution for conservative Republicans in the control condition.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics
Amount of participants Share
Income lower than $30,000 289 0.19
Income between $30,000 and $60,000 426 0.28
Income between $60,000 and $100,000 392 0.25
Income between $100,000 and $140,000 174 0.11
Income higher than $140,000 161 0.10
Less than high school 19 0.01
High school/GED 262 0.17
Some college 322 0.21
Associate degree 185 0.12
Bachelor degree 406 0.26
Postgraduate degree 287 0.19
Non-white participants 388 0.25
User of social media 1359 0.88
Observations 1549
Note: The table provides an overview of demographic variables for all participants in the
experiment.
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Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics
Baseline Treatment
Income lower than $30,000 0.18 0.19
Income between $30,000 and $60,000 0.28 0.27
Income between $60,000 and $100,000 0.26 0.24
Income between $100,000 and $140,000 0.11 0.11
Income higher than $140,000 0.10 0.11
Less than high school 0.01 0.01
High school/GED 0.16 0.18
Some college 0.23 0.19
Associate degree 0.11 0.13
Bachelor degree 0.27 0.25
Postgraduate degree 0.18 0.19
Non-white participants 0.25 0.25
Age 47.39 47.60
Belief about effect on self 2.38 2.41
Belief about the effect on Democrats 3.07 3.08
Belief about the effect on Republicans 3.17 3.07
Privacy Concerns 5.60 5.67
User of social media 0.89 0.87
Observations 794 755
Note: The table provides an overview of demographic variables for participants split into
treatment and control condition in the experiment.
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Table 3.5: Regression of correlates for the size of the difference between other party and
own party





Desirability of advertising -0.149∗∗∗
(0.017)














Use of internet in hours 0.003
(0.005)
Use of ad-block 0.018
(0.029)
User of social media 0.000
(0.085)








Note: The table reports the results for an OLS-regression with the difference between
people’s belief about the effect of targeted political advertising on the other - the own party
as dependent variable. The dependent variable is standardized. Affective and Ideological
polarization are standardized. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.6: Regression of determinants for the willingness to support stricter regulation of
targeted advertising
Support for regulation Support for regulation
Belief about own party -0.043 -0.010
(0.038) (0.048)
Belief about other party 0.169∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.039)
Belief about self X -0.019
(0.046)





social media use No Yes
Political Engagement No Yes
Note: Regressions only include participants that answered all questions of the survey. The
table reports results from an OLS-regression in which people’s support for regulation is the
dependent variable. The value is standardized. Belief other party is measured as participants’
belief about the effect that targeted political advertisement has on other supporters of the
other party. Belief own party is defined as the belief that participants have about the effect
targeted political advertising has on supporters of their own party. Belief about self is
people’s belief about the effect that targeted political advertising has on them. Privacy
concerns are respondents’ are measured on a seven-point 4 item-Likert scale. All three
independent variables are standardized. Demographic information included age, education
(dummy for above median in the sample), income (dummy for above median in the sample),
household size (dummy for more than two members), gender (male dummy variable) and a
dummy for being non-white. Social media use was a dummy variable for the use of social
media, a continuous variable for the time people spent online in general (in hours), and
the use of an ad-blocker (dummy for yes). Political engagement was a dummy variable for
being politically active within the last year, external political efficacy, political knowledge
(dummy for above median knowledge), and attitudes towards government regulation in
general. Table 3.11 in the appendix provides an overview of all variables in the regression.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.7: Effect of the information treatment on Republicans - Only Republicans that want
that Congress takes their answers into account
Baseline Treatment Difference
Observations 388 381
Demand for regulation 4.58 4.41 -0.17∗
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Demand for regulation measured on a four item 7 point Likert scale. p-value = 0.03 for one-sided t-test
Note: The table summarizes a Welsh-t-test that is run to compare Republicans’ support for
regulation. Support for regulation was measured on a four item 7 point Likert scale. Only
Republicans who want their answers to be taken into account by Congress are included.
The p-value of that test was 0.03 for a one-sided t-test. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Support for regulation 4.59 4.47 -0.12
Demand for regulation measured on a four item 7 point Likert scale. p-value = 0.10 for one-sided t-test
Note: The table summarizes a Welsh-t-test that is run to compare Republicans’ support for
regulation. Support for regulation was measured on a four item 7 point Likert scale. Only
Republicans who trust the presented research finding were included. The p-value of that















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.10: Regression of Determinants for the willingness to regulate targeted ads - Alter-
native regulation measure












social media use No Yes
Political engagement No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Regressions only include participants that answered all questions of the survey. The
table reports the results of an OLS-regression with the support for regulation as a dependent
variable. The variable was standardized. Treatment is a dummy variable that is 1 when the
participant was assigned to the treatment condition and 0 otherwise. Republican is a dummy
variable that is 1 when the participant is a Republican and 0 if he or she is a Democrat.
Treatment*Republican is the interaction of these two variables. Privacy concerns is a measure
of people’s privacy concerns. The value is standardized. Demographic information included
age, education (dummy for above median in the sample), income (dummy for above median
in the sample), household size (dummy for more than two members), gender (male dummy
variable) and a dummy for being non-white. Social media use was a dummy variable for
the use of social media, a continuous variable for the time people spent online in general (in
hours), and the use of an ad-blocker (dummy for yes). Political engagement was a dummy
variable for being politically active within the last year, external political efficacy, political
knowledge (dummy for above median knowledge), and attitudes towards government
regulation in general. Table 3.12 in the appendix provides an overview of all variables in the
regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.11: Regression of determinants for the willingness to support stricter regulation of
targeted advertising - All controls
Support for regulation


















Use of internet in hours -0.002
(0.006)
Use of ad-block -0.062
(0.035)
User of social media 0.149
(0.128)
Attitude towards government regulation 0.017
(0.018)










Note: The table reports results for the OLS-regression with the dependent variable Support
for regulation. The dependent variable was standardized. Belief other party-own party is
defined as the difference between people’s belief about the effect on the other party and
the effect on the own party. Belief about self is people’s belief about the effect that targeted
political advertising has on them. Privacy concerns are respondents’ are measured on a
seven-point 4 item-Likert scale. All three independent variables are standardized. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
183























User of social media 0.047
(0.085)
Use of internet in hours 0.001
(0.004)






Attitude towards government regulation 0.019
(0.013)






Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: The table reports results for the OLS-regression with the dependent variable Support
for regulation. The dependent variable was standardized. Treatment is a dummy variable
that is 1 when the participant was assigned to the treatment condition and 0 otherwise.
Republican is a dummy variable that is 1 when the participant is a Republican and 0 if he or
she is a Democrat. Treatment*Republican is the interaction of these two variables. Privacy
concerns is a measure of people’s privacy concerns. The value is standardized. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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